



# Evaluation of the EU Small Arms and Light Weapons Assistance to the Kingdom of Cambodia (EU-ASAC)



**SEESAC**

South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse  
for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons



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The **South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons** (SEESAC) has a mandate from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe (SCSP) to further support all international and national stakeholders by strengthening national and regional capacity to control and reduce the proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons, and thus contribute to enhanced stability, security and development in South Eastern and Eastern Europe.

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### ***Evaluation of the EU SALW Assistance to the Kingdom of Cambodia (EU-ASAC), SEESAC, 2006***

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## Acronyms

ADHOC	Cambodian Human Rights and Development Association (NGO)
CCCB	Commune Council Capacity Building
CHRTF	Cambodian Human Rights Task Force (NGO)
CIDH	Cambodian Institute for Development and Human Rights (NGO)
CMAC	Cambodia Mine Action Centre
CoC	Code of Conduct
CSBM	Confidence and Security Building Measures
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DAC	Development Assistance Committee (OECD)
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
EC	European Commission
EU	European Union
EU-ASAC	EU Assistance on curbing Small Arms and light weapons in Cambodia
GTZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit GmbH
HHS	Household Survey
IMAS	International Mine Action Standards
ISO	International Standardization Organization
I&CD	Institutional and Capacity Development
JCCP	Japanese Centre for Conflict Prevention
JSAC	Japanese Assistance Team for Small Arms Management in Cambodia
KII	Key Informant Interviews
LFA	Logical Framework Analysis
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MoD	Ministry of Defence
MoEF	Ministry of Economy and Finance
MoI	Ministry of Interior
NCWMR	National Commission for Weapons Management and Reform
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
NIP	National Indicative Programme (EU and Cambodia)
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (DAC)
OKFDA	O'Chloungh Khmer Family Development Association (NGO)
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PRDC	Provincial Rural Development Committee
RBM	Results Based Management
RCAF	Royal Cambodian Armed Forces
RKFA	Rescue Khmer Farmers Association (NGO)
RMDS/G	Regional Micro-Disarmament Standards and Guidelines (SEE)
SAA	Small Arms Ammunition (Calibre 14.5mm and below)
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SAPS	SALW Perceptions Survey (Confirmatory)
SEESAC	South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of SALW
TCO	Technical Cooperation Office (EU, Phnom Penh)



UN	United Nations
UNDDA	United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
VAT	Value Added Tax
VWCP	Voluntary Weapons Collection Programme
WCP	Weapons Collection Point
WED	Weapons in Exchange for Development
WfD	Weapons for Development
WGWR	Working Group for Weapons Reduction
VMG	Village Model Gardens
VMPF	Village Model Poultry Farms



## Executive Summary

### Introduction

In 1998, after thirty years of war, genocide, internal conflict and civil disorder, the new Royal Government of Cambodia made its first serious attempt to tackle the problems caused by SALW in the country. The government recognised that the continued availability and proliferation of large quantities of illegal weapons, combined with inadequate national stockpile security, was major threat to the improving peace and stability in the country. Armed violence, a lack of government control of weapons, the risks of political violence and the negative impact of weapons on social and economic development were all reasons to quickly develop a comprehensive response. The combination of poverty, crime and unemployment, coupled with a degree of political instability and public perceptions of insecurity, meant that voluntary weapons collection initiatives were always going to be a challenge.



Addressing the proliferation and possession of SALW in Cambodia was therefore clearly a complex task. The Royal Government of Cambodia lacked the financial resources, technical experience, national capacity, infrastructure and operational procedures necessary for effective stockpile management and security. Yet the Royal Government of Cambodia persuaded the international community of the governments' commitment to maintaining control of the improving security situation, and this was backed up the commencement of activities on the ground. It was therefore appropriate that the development of the EU-ASAC<sup>1</sup> programme should be one of the first Joint Action initiatives established under the framework of the Common Foreign Security Policy. The programme had relevance not only for the Royal Government of Cambodia, but also the European Union.

EU-ASAC began operations in April 2000, and over the next six years engaged in strengthening the legal framework, weapons collection, weapons destruction, stockpile management, the detection and clearance of illegal weapons caches, development of police capacity, NGO capacity development and SALW awareness. It was a wide-ranging programme that responded to changing dynamics on the ground, and enjoyed a strong working relationship with the majority of partners and stakeholders.

### Impact, effectiveness and efficiency

The very significant reduction in armed violence in Cambodia over the last seven years indicates that the EU-ASAC programme has had a **positive impact** on countering the proliferation of SALW, and has therefore also made a contribution towards the improvement of human security in the country. This impact alone justifies the support initiated under Joint Action 1999/730/CFSP, and should also positively influence current and future EU engagement in similar SALW Control programmes elsewhere.

From the perspective of **effectiveness**, the EU-ASAC programme has achieved its overall aim of providing technical support and assistance to the Royal Government of Cambodia initiative to counter the

Impacts (Outcomes)	
Percentage of estimated 1991 weapons taken under government control	82 %
Armed Violence (Homicide) Reduction (1998 - 2003)	70 %
Overall Homicide Rate Reduction (1998 - 2003)	55 %
Armed Robbery Reduction (1996 - 2004)	7 %
Variance in 'Black Market' Weapon Prices (Assault Rifle)	+ 440 %

<sup>1</sup> The full title is: **EU Assistance on curbing Small Arms and light weapons in Cambodia.**





availability and proliferation of weapons within Cambodia. EU-ASAC has fulfilled all major project obligations, and valuable lessons have been learned for future projects. The destruction and logistic systems and structures developed by EU-ASAC are based on internationally accepted principles, norms or standards,<sup>2</sup> and are now well understood by their local Cambodian partners and staff. Indeed, many current international 'best practices' have been derived from the pioneering work conducted on SALW Control within Cambodia.

Effectiveness (Outputs)	
Weapons Destroyed	142,871
Weapons Depots Constructed	45
Weapons Placed in Secure Storage	158,760
Weapons Collected	12,775
Weapons Caches Cleared	9
Incentive Delivery (Schools Built/Repaired)	8
Incentive Delivery (Water Wells)	275
Incentive Delivery (Bridges)	4

Efficiency (Outputs) <sup>3</sup>	
Cost per Weapon Destroyed	€ 2.65
Storage Infrastructure Costs per Weapon	€ 10.83
Cost per Weapon Recovered (Caches)	€ 52.86
Administrative Costs <sup>4</sup> (% of Expenditure)	% 8.50
Expenditure against Budget for Capability Delivery	% 76.70

The Weapons for Development component of the programme initially consisted of two large-scale incentive based voluntary weapons collections. The programme then refocused on to NGO delivery of incentives and supported a further nine small-scale activities. Although relatively few weapons were collected over the period of the WfD component, the improvement in perceived and real security in the targeted areas has been measurable. SALW (Weapons) collection has had a positive impact on individuals and communities, who have also benefited from much needed infrastructure development.

It is the opinion of the evaluation team that the programme was managed **efficiently** in terms of cost-benefits and value for money. The costs per weapon destroyed were at the lower end of the 'global market price'; and storage infrastructure development costs are realistic for the Cambodian marketplace. The operational costs per weapon recovered in the WfD components ranged from US\$ 42 (for mini-WfD activities) to US\$ 122 (for large-scale WfD activities). Although this must not be the sole measure of success or impact, the figure does provide a degree of value for money when compared against 'black market' prices at that time of US\$ 160 - 180.

In terms of the costs per weapon recovered from weapons caches, this is the first time that such a cost has been

identified in terms of SALW control projects. Considering the time taken to locate caches, the methodology development, distances covered and search capability developed, the expenditure is realistic and value for money.

The programme team should be commended for delivering the projected outputs and capability for only 77% of the budgeted costs. It would not have been possible to deliver more outputs or capability with the unexpended funds, as the programme manager had always to balance the currency exchange risks of the US Dollar against the Euro to ensure an overspend did not result. During the period of the project there has been up to a 20% variance in exchange rates, and therefore a 77% delivery rate is more than acceptable under these circumstances. The 'Activity Map' (page v) indicates the range of locations and activities supported by EU-ASAC during the period of the project.

In terms of **sustainability**, both the RCAF and elements of the police now have appropriate safe and secure storage locations for the national stockpile of weapons, but more importantly, an effective stockpile management system for weapons has been developed and implemented. Standing operating procedures have been developed, computerised weapon accounting systems developed and installed, and sufficient individuals have been trained on their use. Providing these systems continue to be used as designed, then the risks of proliferation in the future have been significantly reduced. Arms control legislation has been developed, and approved by parliament, and

<sup>2</sup> Current international 'best practices' in the technical areas of EU-ASAC work are contained in IMAS 11.20, RMDS/G 05.20 and the OSCE BPG, which have clearly been implemented as far as was practically possible.


<sup>3</sup> Based on analysis of outputs achieved during 2000 - 2005, for which audited accounts were available. These may change slightly once the financial accounts for the 2006 outputs have been formally audited.

<sup>4</sup> Office, communications and transport.



the effective implementation of this legislation should ensure that the use of illicit weapons as an enabler for armed violence would be constrained. Only effective implementation of this legislation can ensure the sustained reduction in armed violence that has been seen over the last seven years, but the indicators are that the Royal Government of Cambodia is politically committed to this.

The programme documentation did not always clearly identify results in terms of 'impact', and progress towards those results was hence difficult to measure both quantitatively and qualitatively. Impact data is difficult to collect in Cambodia, and although in an ideal world support to the Royal Government of Cambodia in developing data collection and collation mechanisms would be highly desirable, the reality is that this could be a 10 year project in its own right; more resources would be committed to developing data mechanisms than in the practical SALW Control components on the ground. Notwithstanding that a results based management concept was not used as a primary means of focusing on component deliverables and impacts, the principles of the project management cycle<sup>5</sup> were followed by the programme team.



Map: EU-ASAC Activities in Cambodia

The adoption of an annual funding mechanism constrained the ability of the EU-ASAC programme to deliver long-term WfD strategies, or to engage in any longer term activities to control weapons within Cambodia. It is now generally accepted that impact of SALW Control programmes are mid- to long-term in nature and therefore should be supported by multi-year funding mechanisms. (Indeed the very success of EU-ASAC shows the impact that sustainable funding can have - but it can be more efficiently and effectively committed if allocated on a multi-year basis).

## Future synergies and needs

Although the link between armed violence and weapons was identified during the project conception phase, EU-ASAC was not mandated to engage in countering the direct criminal use of weapons. Therefore no activities, such as the development of a forensics or weapons intelligence capability, were included that could have addressed this threat. Experience gained on other SALW Control interventions now suggests that this is an important component of a holistic SALW control strategy, and future EU supported interventions should also consider this component during programme development.

Further SALW Control support is still needed by the Royal Government of Cambodia, particularly in terms of; 1) legislation implementation; 2) the development of an effective National SALW Commission and National SALW Control Strategy; 3) activities to address armed violence as a social and development issue; 4) the implementation of an effective Code of Conduct to ensure police compliance with international best practices;<sup>6</sup> 5) improvement of police capability to tackle the criminal use of weapons; 6) the development of democratic oversight mechanisms to support SALW Control measures; 7) the development of safe and secure ammunition storage and management systems; and 8) the disposal of thousands of tonnes of surplus or unsafe ammunition.

Of particular concern is the safety, security and control of the ammunition stockpiles within Cambodia. EU-ASAC was not mandated to engage on wider ammunition issues, although they have identified and quantified the threat. There are estimated to be over 100,000 tonnes of ammunition present in Cambodia, the vast majority of which is stored in unsafe and insecure conditions. It presents a real security threat that could negate all the good work done implementing the control of the weapons, which can easily be operationally replaced by self-contained rocket launchers, detonators and explosives, thereby increasing the threshold of violence during any

<sup>5</sup> 1) Identification of problems and opportunities; 2) Programme and component design; 3) Programme and component implementation; and 4) Evaluation of results and programme redesign.

<sup>6</sup> **UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials**, (General Assembly Resolution 34/169 of 17 December 1979) and **UN Basic Principles for the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials**, (Adopted by the Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, Cuba, 27 August to 07 September 1990).



future periods of political instability, terrorist or criminal activities in the sub-region. The ammunition stockpiles also pose a significant humanitarian threat to the safety of local communities; in 2005 there was an explosion at an ammunition depot caused by stockpile instability<sup>7</sup> resulting in six fatalities and 20 injured. It is inevitable that there will be many more unless this problem is addressed as a matter of priority.

## Recommendations

The establishment of EU-ASAC as a Joint Action under the daily operational management of a Special Advisor has many advantages in terms of the ability of a programme to respond to changing security, political and economic dynamics on the ground. This flexibility is important for SALW Control interventions because of their need to engage in the development, security and humanitarian sectors. The EU could consider this approach for future SALW Control programmes in support of national governments, where appropriate.

Balanced against the above recommendation is the need for longer funding cycles. The EU should consider funding cycles of two years or more for future SALW Control programmes.

Future SALW Control programmes of the EU should not constrain themselves to just specific functional areas of SALW Control such as weapons collection or weapons destruction. They should be provided with the mandate and capability to engage in all areas of SALW Control, as holistic and integrated strategies and responses are more efficient, effective and have longer-term impact.

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<sup>7</sup> 31 March 2005 - Andong Chen.





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# Evaluation of EU-ASAC Assistance to the Kingdom of Cambodia

## 1 Introduction

SEESAC<sup>1</sup> was requested by the Head of the Conventional Disarmament and Human Security Sector (ER/A/4) of the Directorate General External Relations (DG RELEX) to conduct the final evaluation of the EU-ASAC programme in Cambodia.

There have been previous assessments of the EU-ASAC programme,<sup>2</sup> but their remits were limited to specific components and no consistent objective evidence-based evaluation methodology was used or developed. Within the SALW community such objective programme evaluation based on results based management principles, rather than subjective assessments, is still a relatively new concept; therefore this evaluation also serves a dual purpose of introducing a pilot evaluation methodology for consideration for future SALW Control programmes. Evaluation is also complicated by the fact that at the inception of the EU-ASAC programme there was virtually no experience of integrated and holistic SALW Control programmes, and therefore the programme was in effect developing methodologies and 'best practices', which made the development of agreed performance indicators for future evaluations problematic.

The SALW Control community now has a range of 'best practices' and operational support tools available to apply to SALW Control programmes, which are based on the experience gained in a wide range of initiatives over the last five years. The early experience gained in Cambodia, (and Albania 1998/2002), has been invaluable in terms of developing programme methodology and technical support. It would therefore be unfair to evaluate the EU-ASAC Cambodia programme strictly in line with current 'best practices' and methodology as; 1) they were not available at the inception of the programme; and 2) EU-ASAC has contributed so much to their development.

The evaluation<sup>3</sup> of this programme was also complicated by the project management methodology initiated by the European Commission. As a Joint Action under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), an EU Special Advisor who also acted as the project manager, under a direct contract with the European Commission, implemented the EU-ASAC programme. This is a different process to programmes carried out under the EC development budget. Decisions to extend the project from November 2000 onwards were made on the basis of the project manager's Annual Reports, which were circulated to member states'. The Terms of Reference (TOR) for the project manager, contained within the relevant European Council Decisions, formed the basis for the mandate for that funding year.<sup>4</sup> Although Outputs were forwarded to the EU on an annual basis, no formal project Inputs, desirable Outcomes<sup>5</sup> and Impacts were developed, although they could be extrapolated and implied from the project manager's TOR. Notwithstanding this much was achieved, and this evaluation has 'extracted' the relevant Inputs, desirable Outcomes and Impacts from the available documentation, structured interviews and a limited confirmatory 'SALW Perceptions Survey'.

In contrast the project components supported by bi-lateral donors (primarily the Netherlands and GTZ Germany) were developed using the Logical Framework Analysis (LFA) concept, with clear 'Objectives' and 'Indicators'.

### Box 4: The Language of Results

**Inputs:** The financial, human and material resources used by the programme.

**Outputs:** The goods (e.g. weapon storage racks) and services (e.g. weapons destroyed), which are directly produced by a project or programme.

**(Intermediate) Outcomes:** The short- and medium-term effects arising from people making use of the outputs delivered by a project or programme, (e.g. increased weapons security leading to lower weapons proliferation).

**(Final) Outcomes (Impact):** The long-term and sustained effects (positive and negative) arising from a project or programme, (e.g. improved perceptions of human security resulting in increased economic investment and less national capital spent on internal security).

**Source:** DAC/OECD (2002)

<sup>1</sup> SEESAC was selected as; 1) it is a Regional SALW Initiative; 2) it has developed a range of operational support tools; 3) it is mainly EU funded; 4) it is one of the few operational institutions with the range of technical skills necessary for the evaluation of the wide ranging and differing components of the EU-ASAC project; and 5) it is independent from the EU-ASAC project.

<sup>2</sup> See Bibliography.

<sup>3</sup> Defined as: 'a process that attempts to determine as systematically and objectively as possible the merit or value of an intervention'.

<sup>4</sup> E Mail communication from David de Beer, Special Advisor and EU-ASAC Project Manager, 160515B March 2006.

<sup>5</sup> These are the basic 'building blocks' of a Results Based Management (RBM) approach.



The use of this evaluation approach should be able to demonstrate to donors and stakeholders the Outputs the programme has achieved over its seven-year life span, and also provide guidance on Outcomes achieved, and hence the impact of the programme on illicit possession and proliferation of weapons within Cambodia. Whilst quantitative data is readily available on components such as SALW (Weapons) Collection and Destruction, data in terms of the 'impact' of the programme is more difficult to identify. It is relatively simple to determine whether the '*job has been done right*' in terms of efficiency and financial probity, it is much more difficult to establish whether '*the right job has been done*' in terms of effectiveness and impact. In order to determine whether the '*right job has been done*', the evaluation examined:

- **Effectiveness.**<sup>6</sup> Were the planned Outputs (and Outcomes) achieved in accordance with international 'best practices'?
- **Efficiency.**<sup>7</sup> Did the inputs of the programme result in productive or cost-effective outputs?
- **Relevance.**<sup>8</sup> Were the implied objectives set for the programme consistent with government and donor policies, and the requirements of the beneficiary communities?
- **Sustainability.**<sup>9</sup> Were the capacity and capability of the Cambodian government and CSO partners adequately developed to ensure that 'self sufficiency' was achieved for the future?
- **Impact.**<sup>10</sup> What were the longer-term effects of the programme judged against implied Outcomes?

This evaluation does not attempt to cover the 'history' of the programme or the activities in detail, as these; 1) have already been well covered in the previous subjective assessments and the project manager's annual reports; and 2) would result in an extremely large document that would replicate existing information. The evaluation will, however, summarise the main components of, and developments during, the programme.

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6 Defined as: '*the extent to which an outcome is achieved through interventions*' or '*the extent to which a programme achieves its planned results (goals, purposes and outputs) and contributes to outcomes*'.

7 Defined as: '*the optimal transformation of inputs into outputs*'.

8 Defined as: '*the degree to which the objectives of the programme remain valid and pertinent as originally planned, or as subsequently modified owing to changing circumstances within the immediate context and external environment of the programme*'.

9 Defined as: '*the durability of positive programme results after termination of the programme*'. Sustainability reflects whether the positive change in the situation relevant to the programme will endure.

10 Defined as: '*the overall and long-term effect of an intervention*'. (This is in contrast to the Outcomes, which reflect more immediate results).



## 2 Evolution and development of the EU-ASAC programme

Following Japanese occupation during the Second World War, Cambodia gained full independence from France in 1953, but transition was not smooth. In April 1975, after a five-year struggle, communist Khmer Rouge forces captured Phnom Penh, leading to at least 1.5 million Cambodians dying from execution, forced hardships, or starvation during the Pol Pot regime. A December 1978 Vietnamese invasion drove the Khmer Rouge into the countryside, began a ten-year Vietnamese occupation, and led to almost 13 years of civil war. Although the 1991 Paris Peace Accords mandated democratic elections and a ceasefire, this was not fully respected by the Khmer Rouge. The 1993 UN sponsored elections helped restore some semblance of normalcy under a coalition government, but this ended in 1997 after more factional fighting. A second round of national elections in 1998 led to the formation of another coalition government and renewed political stability.

So in 1998, after nearly thirty years of war, genocide, internal conflict and civil disorder, the Royal Government of Cambodia made its first serious attempt to tackle the problems caused by SALW in the country. The government recognised that the continued availability and proliferation of large quantities of illegal weapons, combined with inadequate national stockpile security, was a major threat to the improving peace and stability in the country. The impact of these weapons on Cambodian society, communities and institutions included:

- Fuelling crime and armed violence;
- Providing armed groups with the capability for extreme violence;
- Increasing the risks of future destabilisation;
- Contributing to human rights violations;
- Increasing the risks of political violence;
- Hindering the implementation of the 'Rule of Law';
- Contributing to a culture of impunity within the security architecture;
- Ineffective control of government stocks of SALW; and
- Contributing to inertia in social and economic development.

Addressing the proliferation and possession of SALW in Cambodia was therefore clearly a complex task. The Royal Government of Cambodia lacked the financial resources, technical experience, national capacity, infrastructure and operational procedures necessary for effective stockpile management and security. The concepts of community based policing and a 'Code of Conduct' for law enforcement officials were distant aspirations, and indeed even 'operational standards' within the army and police were variable.

The combination of poverty, crime and unemployment, coupled with a degree of political instability and a general public perception of insecurity, meant that voluntary weapons collection initiatives were always going to be challenging. Individuals and communities had ultimately to be convinced that the voluntary surrender of illicit weapons was in their own interest; only appropriate incentives could influence this decision making process.

Despite their scarcity of resources, low national capacity and basic methodologies, the Royal Government of Cambodia commenced weapons registration under Sub-Decree No.68 in 1998, and then weapons collection in 1999 following the enactment of Government Sub-Decrees No. 27 and 28 (revoking weapon licences) and No. 38 (management of weapons). These legal instruments initially resulting in legal weapons registration, and then made the private possession of weapons illegal. They were implemented using a mixture of persuasive and coercive activities to collect illegal weapons from individuals and communities. Initial success in urban areas was good, but the results in rural areas were very variable, and it was apparent that more imaginative approaches would be needed. However, this demonstration of political will by the Royal Government of Cambodia, backed up by action on the ground, persuaded the international community of the governments' commitment to maintaining control of the improving security situation.

On 17 December 1998 the European Council had adopted Joint Action 1999/34/CFSP on the *European Union's contribution to combating the destabilising accumulation and spread of small arms and light weapons*. Article



4(a) of the Joint Action provided for the provision of assistance as appropriate to countries requesting support for controlling or eliminating surplus small arms and their ammunition on their territory, in particular where this may help to prevent armed conflict or in post-conflict situations. Cambodia could obviously be considered for assistance under this parameter.

The Royal Government of Cambodia therefore appealed to the European Union for assistance to support SALW Control activities. After a fact-finding mission to Cambodia, the Council of Ministers of the European Commission decided to support the Royal Government of Cambodia in its effort to combat the potentially destabilising accumulation and spread of SALW throughout the country and to contribute to promoting the control, collection and destruction of weapons in the country. The Council of Ministers further assessed that this excessive and uncontrolled accumulation of SALW posed a threat to peace and security and reduced the prospects for sustainable development. Therefore EU support to Cambodia clearly fell within the rationale and remit of the European Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and the EU-ASAC programme was one of the first Joint Action initiatives established under the institutional framework of CFSP.

The EU-ASAC programme in Cambodia opened its office in Phnom Penh in April 2000, and the programme initially consisted of five specific components:<sup>11</sup>

- Assistance to the Royal Government of Cambodia in the development of appropriate **legislative and regulatory instruments** to control the ownership, possession, use, sale and transfer of weapons and ammunition;
- Assistance to the Royal Government of Cambodia and the police and security forces in developing procedures for the voluntary surrender and **collection of weapons**;
- Assistance to the Royal Government of Cambodia and the police and security forces in developing procedures for identifying and **destroying surrendered and surplus weapons**, particularly in connection with planned demobilisation and restructuring of the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF);
- Assistance to the Royal Government of Cambodia and the police and security forces to develop guidelines for improved record-keeping and enhancing **stockpile management and security for weapons** held by them; and
- **Support to civil society** programmes to raise **public awareness** on problems related to small arms and light weapons and to further develop civil society cooperation with the weapons collection and destruction process, in particular by supporting activities of the NGOs.

The rationale of the EU-ASAC programme was basically to closely support the operational activities of the Royal Government of Cambodia, although it was apparent that they would also have to provide policy and technical advice across all aspects of SALW Control. It was agreed that the government and EU-ASAC would have separate but complementary roles, which would be coordinated, and that the focus of the programme would be adjusted in response to any changing security, economic or operational dynamics on the ground. The Cambodian authorities were primarily responsible for SALW (Weapons) Collection, which was supported by EU-ASAC SALW Awareness and Weapons for Development (WfD) schemes. Two large-scale WfD initiatives were supported in the initial phase of the EU-ASAC programme, which were then followed by community micro-WfD incentives.

One of the main activities of the programme has been the provision of financial and technical support for the destruction of surplus military weapons, as well as collected and confiscated weapons. This has acted as a Confidence and Security Building Measure (CSBM) for the weapons collection components, whilst simultaneously supporting the counter-proliferation strategy, which also included EU-ASAC support for safe and secure weapons storage and stockpile management. The introduction of systematic security procedures and appropriate infrastructure should reduce the dangers of future leakages from government stockpiles.

In 2003 a 'Weapons Cache' component was added to the EU-ASAC programme to identify and secure former warring faction concealed stockpiles of weapons and ammunition in the remote forested areas of the country where large numbers of weapons were thought to remain. The Khmer Rouge were experts at moving quickly and lightly through near-impenetrable areas and often buried significant quantities of weapons in specific areas to facilitate the swifter movement of guerrilla troops. Forces from other factions also buried weapons in order

<sup>11</sup> Which now form five of the eight generally accepted functional areas of integrated and holistic SALW Control interventions.





to prevent them falling into enemy hands or as a future insurance policy should peace not hold. Areas such as the Cardomom Mountains in the south west of Cambodia, the Damreks in the north and the huge forest areas surrounding previous Khmer Rouge strongholds or bases were where weapons were considered to be hidden. At the request of the Deputy Prime Minister, EU-ASAC was requested to provide technical support to the search and destruction operations. This particular activity meant a harsh operating environment due to terrain and distances, and needed EU-ASAC support due to the risk of protective improvised explosive devices and the need for 'on the spot' destruction of weapons and ammunition.

The relevant European Council Resolutions,<sup>12</sup> funding summary, project components and areas of engagement are summarised in this matrix:

DATES	EC RESOLUTION	BUDGET VALUE (€)	PROJECT COMPONENTS	PROVINCES / DISTRICTS
2000	1999/730/CFSP	500,000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Legislation development.</li> <li>Stockpile management and security for SALW (Weapons). (Military)</li> <li>SALW Awareness and CSO development.</li> <li>Technical advice.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Feasibility Study (Military SALW Safe Storage)</li> <li>Feasibility Study WfD: Kratie, Pursat, Kampong Thom</li> </ul>
2001	2000/724/CFSP	1,300,000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Stockpile management and security for military SALW (Weapons).</li> <li>SALW (Weapons) Collection.</li> <li>SALW (Weapons) Destruction.</li> <li>SALW Awareness and CSO development.</li> <li>Technical advice.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Kratie (WfD)</li> <li>Pursat (WfD)</li> <li>Kampong Cham (MR 2)<sup>13</sup></li> </ul>
2002	2001/796/CFSP	1,768,200	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Stockpile management and security for SALW (Weapons). (Police and Military)</li> <li>SALW Awareness and CSO development.</li> <li>SALW (Weapons) Destruction</li> <li>Technical advice.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Battambang (MR 5)</li> <li>Feasibility Study (Police Weapons Safe Storage)</li> </ul>
2003	2002/904/CFSP	1,568,000		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Kandal (Police)</li> <li>Kampong Speu (Police)</li> <li>Phnom Penh (Police)</li> </ul>
2004	2003/806/CFSP	1,436,953		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Stung Treng (MR 1)</li> </ul>
2005	2004/792/CFSP	1,375,565	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Legislation development.</li> <li>Stockpile management and security for SALW (Weapons).</li> <li>SALW (Weapons) Destruction</li> <li>Technical advice.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Phnom Penh (SMR)<sup>14</sup></li> <li>Royal Gendarmerie</li> </ul>
2006 <sup>15</sup>	2005/784/CFSP	600,000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Stockpile management and security for SALW (Weapons).</li> <li>SALW (Weapons) Destruction</li> <li>Technical Advice.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Royal Cambodian Air Force</li> <li>Royal Cambodian Navy</li> </ul>
<b>TOTAL BUDGET<sup>16</sup></b>		<b>€ 8,548,718</b>		

**Table 1: Summary of EU-ASAC programme components**

<sup>12</sup> Although the European Council Resolutions were for the time frame November - November, the implementation was conducted over the January - December calendar year in order to simplify project administration and reporting.

<sup>13</sup> Military Region.

<sup>14</sup> Special Military Region.

<sup>15</sup> Until 30 June 2006.

<sup>16</sup> Although the actual expenditure (2000 - 2005) was only 77% of budget.




The programme also attracted bi-lateral support from donors, which was administered through the EU-ASAC programme, (see paragraph 5.3.4). This aspect of their work does not form part of this evaluation, as the donors have conducted their own assessments of the EU-ASAC impact on their behalf. One of these initial donors was the Government of Japan, who then decided to establish their own programme, the Japanese Assistance Team for Small Arms Management in Cambodia (JSAC), in 2003. This particular intervention was not particularly helpful in terms of a coordinated approach by the international community to supporting SALW control within Cambodia, and is discussed later (see paragraph 4.4.2).



### 3 Evaluation methodology

#### 3.1 Analysis - Institutional and Capacity Development (I&CD) issues

Many things are required for effective organisational performance. First, the organisation must have the requisite capacity, based around individual skills and knowledge, sound management systems, a proper organisational structure, and adequate resources. Second, an organisation's performance may be enhanced or constrained by the actions of other organisations with which it must work. Finally, institutions<sup>17</sup> create an incentive structure for an organisation, which will determine whether it and its staff are motivated to pursue the organisation's mandate. These different factors underlying an organisations performance (capacities; coordination; and incentives) are illustrated in the Venn diagram.



Organisational performance issues can also be grouped into four levels to create the basic I&CD framework, depicted below:

LEVEL	TYPICAL PERFORMANCE ISSUES	POSSIBLE ACTIONS
<b>Individual</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Skills.</li> <li>• Experience.</li> <li>• Employee demographics, (gender, ethnic etc).</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Staff training.</li> <li>• Recruitment policies and procedures.</li> </ul>
<b>Organisational</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• General management approaches.</li> <li>• Functional management policies, (finance, personnel, logistics etc).</li> <li>• Information systems.</li> <li>• Resources.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Management training.</li> <li>• Revise policies and procedures.</li> <li>• System development.</li> <li>• Fundraising drives.</li> </ul>
<b>Task networks</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Coordination with other SALW Control organisations.</li> <li>• Coordination with other government bodies.</li> <li>• Coordination with other development agencies.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Establish SALW Control working groups.</li> <li>• Revise government liaison processes.</li> <li>• Regional or community development working groups.</li> </ul>
<b>Institutional environment/ Incentive structure</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Public governance problems.</li> <li>• Multiple objectives within the international community or donors.</li> <li>• Donor policies.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Revise national SALW Control legislation and procedures.</li> <li>• Establish consultative group, (or donor coordination mechanism).</li> <li>• Revise format for project proposals and progress reporting to agree with donor requirements.</li> </ul>

**Table 2: Basic institutional and capacity development framework**

Performance development entails identifying and resolving constraints arising in any or all of these levels. This I&CD framework is used to ensure that problems and opportunities are examined in a systematic fashion. This methodology has been used as a benchmark throughout this assessment report, but the report is not structured

<sup>17</sup> Often the term 'institution' is used in reference to organisations - particularly well-known organisations such as the ICRC. Increasingly however, 'institution' is used to refer to laws and social norms that establish incentives to act along certain lines or to avoid certain behaviours. In this latter case, as it is used in this report, 'institutions' are 'rules of the game' while organisations and individuals are the 'players'.



in the above format; rather it has been designed to cover separate distinct task areas, based on Outputs and Outcomes, as the evaluation team considered that this was the best approach to identify performance and overall impact.

### 3.2 Identification of programme components

The separate functional area<sup>18</sup> components of the programme were identified as shown in the following matrix:

LOCATION/PROVINCE/ MILITARY REGION	SALW LEGISLATION DEVELOPMENT	SALW COLLECTION	SALW DESTRUCTION	SALW STOCKPILE MANAGEMENT AND SECURITY	SALW AWARENESS AND CSO DEVELOPMENT	COMMUNITY POLICE TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT
<b>National Government</b>	2000 - 2006					
<b>Banteay Meanchey</b>			2001 / 2002			
<b>Battambang</b>		2002 - 2003	2001 / 2002		2002 - 2003	
<b>Kampong Cham</b>		2002 - 2003	2001 / 2004		2002 - 2003	2003
<b>Kampong Chhnang</b>			2001 / 2005			2003
<b>Kampong Som</b>		2002 - 2003	2005		2002 - 2003	
<b>Kampong Speu</b>		2002 - 2003	2002 / 2005	2003 (Police)	2002 - 2003	2003
<b>Kampong Thom</b>			2001 - 2004			2003
<b>Kandal</b>			2006	2003 (Police)		
<b>Koh Kong</b>			2004			
<b>Kompot</b>		2002 - 2003	2003 / 2005		2002 - 2003	2003
<b>Kratie</b>		2001 - 2002	2001 - 2006			2002
<b>Krong Kep</b>						2003
<b>Krong Pailin</b>						2003
<b>Otdar Meanchey</b>			2005			
<b>Pailin</b>		2002 - 2003	2001		2002 - 2003	
<b>Phnom Penh (SMR)</b>				2005 - 2006		
<b>Phnom Penh (Police)</b>				2003		
<b>Preah Vihear</b>		2003	2003 / 2006		2003	2003
<b>Pursat</b>		2001 - 2003	2001 - 2005		2003	2002 - 2003
<b>Rattanakiri</b>			2002			
<b>Siem Reap</b>			2002 - 2006			
<b>Stung Treng</b>			2003 / 2004			
<b>Svay Rieng</b>			2004			
<b>Takeo</b>		2002 - 2003	2001		2002 - 2003	
<b>MR 1 Stung Treng +</b>				2004 - 2006		
<b>MR 2 Kampong Cham</b>				2001 - 2006		
<b>MR 3 Kampong Speu +</b>				2005 - 2006		
<b>MR 4 Siem Reap +</b>				2003 - 2006		
<b>MR 5 Battambang +</b>				2002 - 2006		
<b>Royal Gendarmerie</b>				2005 - 2006		
<b>Royal Air Force</b>				2006		
<b>Royal Navy</b>				2006		
<b>WGWR</b>					2001 - 2006	

**Table 3: EU-ASAC programme components, dates and locations**

The Inputs, Outputs and desirable Outcomes for each functional area component of the programme were identified qualitatively and quantitatively, and then rated.

<sup>18</sup> Based on the internationally accepted functional areas of SALW Control; 1) Legislative and regulatory issues; 2) Cross border controls; 3) SALW Survey; 4) SALW Collection; 5) SALW Destruction; 6) Stockpile management; 7) SALW Awareness; and 8) Information management.





### 3.3 Rating system<sup>19</sup>

The following rating system was used, where possible, for the evaluation of the components of this programme:

KEY ELEMENTS	YES	PARTIAL	NO
<b>Outputs</b>	Achieved	Only if 66% or more of the quantifiable target was achieved.	Not achieved.

**Table 4: Output rating system**

KEY ELEMENTS	POSITIVE CHANGE	NEUTRAL CHANGE	NEGATIVE CHANGE
<b>Outcomes</b>	Positive move from initial baseline to the target as measured by outcome indicators.	No perceptible change between baseline and target as measured by outcome indicators.	Reversal to a level below the baseline as measured by the outcome indicators.

**Table 5: Outcome rating system**

### 3.4 Qualitative and quantitative evaluation (indicators)

Quantitative and qualitative indicators were discussed with the programme management team and their national counterparts, and then data collection was conducted to identify evidence to support programme outputs and outcomes.

The evaluation team also looked specifically at the impact EU-ASAC had on the:

- **Deterrence** of individuals, groups and organizations from illegally possessing SALW;
- **Denial** of access to SALW by inappropriate holders or users;
- **Disruption** of criminal operations, and their movement and storage of SALW; and
- **Destruction** of surrendered, captured or surplus SALW.

The following matrices was developed and agreed, and then applied to individual programme components, as appropriate:

<sup>19</sup> As used in the UNDP Monitoring and Evaluation system.



PROGRAMME COMPONENT	OUTPUTS	OUTPUT INDICATORS
Legislative and Regulatory	Development of appropriate and effective weapons legislation.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Effective arms control, export and transfers legislation drafted.</li> <li>Arms control legislation adopted by parliament and brought onto the national statute.</li> <li>Formation and operation of National SALW Commission. <i>(Also an outcome indicator).</i></li> <li>Development and implementation of a National SALW Control Strategy. <i>(Also an outcome indicator).</i></li> <li>Increase in prosecutions for weapons related offences. <i>(Also an outcome indicator).</i></li> <li>Reduction in number of weapons related offences. <i>(Also an outcome indicator).</i></li> <li>Effective legislation to control Private Security Company (PSC) activities.</li> </ul>
	Development of an effective National SALW Commission and SALW Control Strategy.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Formation of National SALW Commission.</li> <li>Regular meetings of the National SALW Commission.</li> <li>Development and implementation of an effective National SALW Control Strategy.</li> </ul>
SALW (Weapons) Collection	Safe and effective SALW (Weapons) collection.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Number of weapons collected.</li> <li>Cost (€) per weapon collected.</li> <li>Number of casualties during weapon collection process.</li> <li>Variance in 'street price' of weapons in targeted areas.</li> <li>Delivery of development components in exchange for weapons surrendered.</li> <li>Technical support provided for the location and safe clearance of weapons caches and 'hides'</li> <li>SALW Perception Survey (SAPS) to identify changes in individual and community perceptions towards gun proliferation and availability.</li> </ul>
SALW (Weapons) Destruction	Safe and effective SALW (Weapons) destruction.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Number of weapons destroyed.</li> <li>Cost (€) per weapon destroyed.</li> <li>Number of casualties during weapon destruction activities.</li> </ul>
SALW (Weapons) Stockpile Management	Development of safe and secure SALW (Weapons) storage infrastructure and systems.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Construction of appropriate safe and secure storage infrastructure.</li> <li>Development, installation and training on weapons registration software.</li> <li>Development and implementation of effective operating procedures.</li> <li>Infrastructure development costs per weapon stored.</li> </ul>
SALW Awareness and CSO Development	Effective and targeted SALW Awareness strategies and campaigns.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Active participation of CSO/NGO in WFD activities.</li> <li>Confirmatory SALW Perception Survey to measure impact of SALW Awareness activities.</li> <li>Media monitoring of coverage of SALW (positive/neutral/negative).</li> <li>Campaigns to support SALW Collection and Weapons Security.</li> </ul>
Police Capacity Development (Bi-lateral Funding)	Improve capacity of the police to deliver community security.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Development and government approval of a formal, published 'Code of Conduct'.</li> <li>Donation of equipment to police to enhance capability to provide security post-voluntary weapons collection.</li> <li>Implementation of small-scale development projects to improve legal police family income options.</li> <li>Design and delivery of Community Based Police (CBP) training packages to police officers.</li> <li>SALW Perception Survey (SAPS) to identify changes in individual and community perceptions of the police.</li> </ul>

Table 6: Output indicators



OUTCOMES	OUTCOME INDICATORS
<b>A reduction in armed violence.</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Variance in armed violence and weapon related crime statistics.</li> <li>▪ Reduction in the open visibility of weapons in the community.</li> <li>▪ Reduction in the number of weapons available to criminals.</li> </ul>
<b>Reduction in, or disruption to, the illicit trade and transfer of SALW.</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Variance in weapons seizures by the security services.</li> <li>▪ Effective control of legal weapons transfers and trade.</li> <li>▪ Reduction in the number of weapons losses within the security sector in the targeted areas.</li> <li>▪ Positive variance in 'black market' weapon prices.</li> </ul>
<b>Improved perceptions of human security in the EU-ASAC areas of operation.</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Positive improvement in individual and community perceptions of human security.</li> </ul>
<b>An effective and functioning National SALW Commission.</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Has a National SALW Commission been established?</li> <li>▪ Was it developed as part of an ALL stakeholder consultative process?</li> <li>▪ Regular meetings and effective parliamentary oversight.</li> </ul>
<b>Development and implementation of an effective National SALW Control Strategy.</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Developed by the National SALW Commission.</li> <li>▪ Disseminated to all relevant stakeholders.</li> <li>▪ Strategy is reviewed and amended on a regular basis to respond to changing dynamics.</li> </ul>
<b>Implementation of appropriate and effective weapons legislation.</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Effective control of weapons transfers.</li> </ul>
<b>Building community awareness of the SALW problem.</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Demonstrated understanding by individuals and communities of the impact of SALW on communities.</li> </ul>
<b>Improved social and economic development opportunities.</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Trends in local investment.</li> <li>▪ Trends in foreign direct investment (FDI).</li> <li>▪ Trends in economic/humanitarian aid requirements.</li> <li>▪ Impact of police family support income generation mini-projects.</li> </ul>
<b>Contribute towards the concept of effective community based policing (CBP).</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <i>The development of an effective CBP concept is a desirable outcome within Cambodia, but was outside the mandate of the EU-ASAC, and work was conducted in support of other initiatives as a result of identified synergy. This is a massive task, that EU-ASAC was only financially positioned to make a contribution towards the development of concepts, principles and pilot projects.</i></li> </ul>

**Table 7: Outcome indicators**

### 3.5 Confirmatory SALW Perception Survey (SAPS)

The evaluation contains participatory components, where all stakeholders were consulted, (within the limitations of time, space and the small size of the evaluation team). Whilst traditional Key Informant Interviews (KII) were held with government stakeholders, a confirmatory SALW Perceptions Survey was also developed from the principles laid down in the SALW Survey Protocols,<sup>20</sup> and then conducted at the individual and village level.<sup>21</sup> This

<sup>20</sup> See [www.seesac.org](http://www.seesac.org). SALW Survey Protocols.

<sup>21</sup> KII with villagers were conducted to reveal their perceptions of security, trust in the police and awareness of SALW in the Provinces of Kampong Cham, Preah Vihear and Pursat, which were targeted by EUASAC with SALW awareness and police training. The evaluation team visited five Districts (two in Kampong Cham and Pursat and one in Preah Vihear). These Districts were selected by EUASAC partner NGOs in Kampong Cham and Preah Vihear and by the Provincial Rural Development Committee in Pursat, based on their willingness to talk with the evaluation team.



involved the conduct of in-depth Key Informant Interviews (KII) using ‘*snowball sampling*’<sup>22</sup> in the communities where the EU-ASAC programme had been active. This component of the evaluation was considered crucial for identifying Outcomes and potential Impact of the EU-ASAC programme.

The KII were designed to provide qualitative assessments of the following:

- The impact of SALW Awareness activities on individuals’ understanding of the manifest ways in which SALW affect a community;
- The impact of the reduction of SALW in the community, on individual and community perceptions of security; and
- The impact of improving the police’s capacity to provide community-level security.

Stakeholders at district-, commune- and village-level were consulted using KIIs, namely Local Authority Governors, Police Inspectors and Chiefs, Village Chiefs and Civil Society Organisations. Village members were selected non-randomly according to profession, wealth, status, gender and geographic location so as to reflect a diversity of experiences resulting from the WfD and police capacity development components.

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<sup>22</sup> A non-random sampling method whereby individuals are selected according to recommendations by interviewees; this method is useful when data is not readily available on the individual profiles of village members. In this way the evaluation team was able to speak with a cross-section of village members.



## 4 Findings

### 4.1 Outputs

The detailed output indicator results of the programme are at Annexes A to F in tabular format. The major outputs of the EU-ASAC programme can be summarised as:

GENERIC OUTPUT AREA	INDICATOR RESULT <sup>23</sup>	RATING
<b>Legislative and Regulatory Issues</b>	▪ Development of effective appropriate arms control, export and transfers legislation.	<b>ACHIEVED</b>
	▪ Adoption of arms control legislation with supporting administrative instruments.	<b>ACHIEVED</b>
	▪ Formation and operation of National SALW Commission.	<b>PARTIAL</b>
	▪ Development and implementation of a National SALW Control Strategy.	<b>NOT ACHIEVED</b>
<b>SALW Collection</b>	▪ 12,775 weapons collected under auspices of EU-ASAC programme.	<b>ACHIEVED</b>
	▪ 43,216 rounds of ammunition collected under auspices of EU-ASAC project.	<b>ACHIEVED</b>
	▪ Nine illegal weapons caches identified and cleared, leading to seizure of an additional 624 weapons and 1,075 rounds of ammunition.	<b>ACHIEVED</b>
	▪ Development projects led to the construction/repair of 8 x Schools, 275 Water Wells, 1 Health Post and 4 Bridges.	<b>ACHIEVED</b>
	▪ No casualties during collection operations.	<b>ACHIEVED</b>
<b>SALW Destruction</b>	▪ 142,871 weapons destroyed.	<b>ACHIEVED</b>
	▪ Cost per weapon destroyed - € 2.65 <sup>24</sup>	<b>ACHIEVED</b>
	▪ No casualties during destruction operations.	<b>ACHIEVED</b>
<b>Stockpile Management and Security</b>	▪ 45 Weapon Storage Depots constructed.	<b>ACHIEVED</b>
	▪ 8 Weapon Storage Depots renovated.	<b>ACHIEVED</b>
	▪ Total storage capacity developed for 158,760 weapons, (including short term weapon storage racks at a wide range of locations).	<b>ACHIEVED</b>
	▪ Appropriate Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) developed and implemented. Training also provided.	<b>ACHIEVED</b>
<b>SALW Awareness and CSO Development</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Level of participation of CSO in WfD programme components.</li> <li>▪ Confirmatory SALW Perceptions Survey.</li> <li>▪ Participation of CSO in WfD activities.</li> <li>▪ Media monitoring of coverage of SALW activities.</li> </ul>	<b>PARTIAL</b>
<b>Police Capacity Development</b>	▪ Development and government approval of a formal, published 'Code of Conduct' was not achieved for political reasons outside EU-ASAC influence.	<b>NOT ACHIEVED</b>
	▪ Procurement of equipment (73 motorcycles, 331 bicycles and 383 radios) to support police operational capacity to provide local security. (Total value = € 170,934).	<b>ACHIEVED</b>
	▪ Design of Community Based Policing (CBP) training package. Delivered to approximately 925 police officers in 2002/2003.	<b>ACHIEVED</b>

**Table 8: Summary of output indicator results**

<sup>23</sup> Indicators that are also 'Outcome' as well as 'Output' are covered in Section 4.2 - Outcomes.

<sup>24</sup> Operational costs of destruction. This is at the lower end of the price range based on experience globally.





## 4.2 Outcomes<sup>25</sup>

It is not possible to definitively state that the positive impacts in reducing armed violence in Cambodia were achieved solely as the direct result of the government and EU-ASAC arms control programmes, as so many other factors, other than weapons availability and lack of controls, influence armed violence. Yet 1998 marks the beginning of the Cambodian government's efforts to remove firearms from civilian control, and 1999 saw the start of the EU-ASAC interventions. Since this time however, there has been a steady decline in armed violence in Cambodia. It is reasonable, however, to draw the conclusion that the commitment of the Royal Government of Cambodia towards reducing the availability and proliferation of weapons, supported by EU-ASAC, has had a considerable positive impact on armed violence within the country.

### 4.2.1 Reduction in armed violence<sup>26</sup>

Data on armed violence is difficult to develop, as there are no consolidated records available from a single source. Research by the WGWR and the Small Arms Survey indicates that firearm homicide has declined dramatically from 4.0 - 5.4 per 100,000 in 1998 to 1.1 - 1.7 in 2003. This is a **reduction of 70%** (using mid-point levels) over a five-year period for which data is available. Qualitative evidence held in the WGWR database also suggests that this low rate of firearms homicide has been sustained over the last two years (2004 - 2005), and this is supported by hospital admission data. This shows that at the high point in 1993, 65% of victims of assault were as a result of gun shot wounds, whilst in 2004 this had fallen to as low as 2.6%. This data is supported by the analysis conducted by the Small Arms Survey of violent incidents reported in the Phnom Penh Post, which showed that the use of firearms in all violent incidents reduced from 80% (1994) to 30% (2004). **Positive Change.**

The overall homicide rate has also dropped from 6.9 - 9.0 per 100,000 in 1998 to 3.1 - 4.0 in 2003. This is a reduction of 55% (using mid-point levels) over the same period. This is a significant indicator of the impact of the SALW control activities within Cambodia, as in 1998 60% of homicides were committed using weapons, and by 2003 this ratio had dropped to 40%. The proportional reduction of armed violence compared to overall crime and violence levels could be explained by the reduction in the availability of weapons, thus reducing the lethality of violence in Cambodia. **Positive Change.**

In terms of injuries sustained by the use of weapons, limited data suggests that the hospital admissions rate for weapon victims has fallen from 4.0% of total admissions in 1998 to 0.1% by 2004. (Although this particular indicator must be treated with caution due to limited data, and the fact that many casualties will not necessarily be treated in hospitals). Notwithstanding this caution it is still a **Positive Change.**

In terms of reported offences, those for armed robbery have fallen from 32% in 1996 to 25% in 2004. This is a measurable reduction, but also could indicate that armed robbery is now at such a level that future SALW Control is unlikely to have a major impact as a 'mean level' has been reached. Further reductions will only come about as a result of routine police crime prevention and detection activities. **Positive Change.**

### 4.2.2 Reduction in, or disruption to, the illicit trade and transfer of SALW

Recent operational research has suggested that the number of weapons available within Cambodia, at the time of the Paris Agreements<sup>27</sup> in 1991, was in the region of 319,500 - 462,500. These figures<sup>28</sup> were determined using social science research methodology for weapons estimates developed over the last five years, and although uncertainty remains, the figures are certainly in the right order of magnitude to a high confidence level.

<sup>25</sup> The detailed firearms homicide statistics and weapon estimates have been extracted from a forthcoming publication by Christina Wille, *Finding the evidence: the links between weapon collection programmes, gun use, and homicide rates in Cambodia*. Small Arms Survey, Geneva, 24 April 2006 (Draft).

<sup>26</sup> Source for data in this section based on the WGWR database; a forthcoming publication by Wille, Christina. *Finding the evidence: the links between weapon collection programmes, gun use, and homicide rates in Cambodia*. Small Arms Survey, Geneva, 24 April 2006 (Draft); and Small Arms Survey. *Stabilizing Cambodia - Small Arms Control and Security Sector Reform*. Small Arms Survey 2006, Chapter 5. Geneva, Switzerland. Released 26 June 2006.

<sup>27</sup> [http://www.c-r.org/accord/cam/accord5/acc\\_cont.shtml](http://www.c-r.org/accord/cam/accord5/acc_cont.shtml)

<sup>28</sup> Data rounded to nearest 250 weapons.



The evaluation team developed the following matrix based on the confirmed weapons statistics and worked backwards to attempt to confirm the recent estimates:

WEAPONS DATA	LOWER RANGE	MEAN	HIGHER RANGE	SOURCE / REMARKS
Weapons Destroyed (1999 - 2006)		192,000		EU-ASAC Data
Weapons in Government Storage (2006)		140,250		EU-ASAC estimates that the government is storing to 85% capacity. It is known that a storage capacity for 164,892 weapons has been developed by EU-ASAC and JSAC.
<i>Sub-Total</i>		332,250		
Small Arms Survey Estimates on Weapon Levels in 1991	319,500	325,500	462,500	
Revised Estimate (1991 Levels) based on EU-ASAC Data and Small Arms Survey Upper Estimate	352,250	407,375	462,500	

**Table 9: Analysis of weapons estimates and data (1991 - 2006)**

This analysis suggest that the lower range estimate of weapons in Cambodian society in 1991 is an underestimate, although there is no reason to dispute the upper estimate of 462,500 weapons. It would also be unrealistic to suggest that there are no illegal weapons in Cambodian society today. The balance between confirmed data in 2006, and the upper estimate for 1991 is 130,250 illicit weapons. Therefore it would not be unrealistic to propose that the balance of illicit weapons remaining in Cambodia is in the range of 20,000 - 130,250 weapons, (a mean of 75,125 weapons).<sup>29 30</sup> **Positive Change.**

Taking appropriate mid-point figures means that approximately 82% of the estimated conflict weapons have been taken under control, which is a remarkable achievement by the Royal Government of Cambodia and their partners. **Positive Change.**

The risks of proliferation of weapons have been significantly reduced by the EU-ASAC development of appropriate safe and secure weapons storage infrastructure and systems for 158,760 weapons. The destruction of 142, 871 weapons under the auspices of EU-ASAC has also been a highly effective counter-proliferation tactic, ensuring that these particular weapons are truly beyond use. **Positive Change.**

The counter-proliferation strategy of the government has been supported by the new arms control legislation, which in effect means that only the government is allowed to purchase, possess or sell weapons in Cambodia. There is no evidence available to suggest that major criminal or armed faction transfers of weapons now take place within Cambodia. Although small scale smuggling for criminal purposes will inevitably continue, this activity can only be countered by intelligence-led police operations, which was outside the mandate of the EU-ASAC programme. This area should be addressed in future security sector reform support to the Royal Government of Cambodia. **Neutral Change.**

The 'black market' price of weapons is often a useful indicator of the effectiveness of a SALW counter-proliferation strategy, although care must be used in how the data is analysed to guard against false deductions. In the case of Cambodia, data is now difficult to obtain, which is at least indicative of the impact that the very restrictive arms laws have had.

<sup>29</sup> The land area of Cambodia is 176,520 square kilometres. Therefore the spatial distribution of illegal weapons is between 0.11 to 0.74 weapons per square kilometre. Alternatively the spatial distribution is 1 illegal weapon in every 1.35 to 8.83 square kilometres, although in reality a number will be concentrated in the main population centres.

<sup>30</sup> With a population of 13,881,000 (CIA World Factbook 2006), this equates to an illegal weapon distribution by population of between 1 for every 107 persons, to 1 for every 694 persons.



WEAPON TYPE	APPROXIMATE COST BY YEAR (US\$)			% VARIANCE (1998 - 2006)	LEGAL COST (2006)
	1998 <sup>31</sup>	2002 <sup>32</sup>	2006 <sup>33</sup>		
Assault Rifle (AK47)	25	160	110	+ 440%	490
Pistol (K54)	120	180	900	+ 750%	408

**Table 10: Summary of trends in 'black market' weapons prices (1998 - 2006)**

A range of factors will have influenced this variance in the prices, but the significant increase in the costs of an illegal pistol suggests a very restricted supply, whilst the decrease in the costs of an illegal assault rifle (between 2002 and 2006) could be explained by the fact that demand has fallen as a result of restrictive arms legislation. Further research would be needed to objectively support this hypothesis. **Positive Change.**

#### 4.2.3 Improved perceptions of human security

The security situation in Cambodia had significantly improved by mid-2002, and the Royal Government of Cambodia then considered that a large proportion of the illegal weapons had been placed under government control. The activities of EU-ASAC in supporting the government in SALW (Weapons) Collection and Destruction undoubtedly made a contribution to this improvement in security. **Positive Change.**

The remaining security problems at that time were largely due to a low capacity of the security forces to maintain law and order, rather than a proliferation of weapons. Consequently large-scale weapons for development projects did not seem to be a realistic proposition in terms of acting purely as an incentive to remove weapons from communities, although there would be development and human security perception benefits. The decision was therefore taken to continue with community level micro-WfD projects, whilst improving the capacity of the RCAF to maintain effective control of their own stocks of SALW.

Recent qualitative research conducted by the WGWR during 2005 <sup>34</sup> suggests that perceptions of human security have significantly improved since 2002, (although it must be remembered that the data set collected by WGWR is insufficient for statistical validity to a known error margin or confidence level, and should therefore be regarded as qualitative rather than quantitative). **Positive Change;**

QUESTION / RESULT	% FINDING		REMARKS
	MALE	FEMALE	
Compared to three years ago, is the security in your area better or worse?	91.4	82.5	% for Better Security
Do you believe there are fewer guns than three years ago?	88.6	71.9	% for Fewer Guns
Does owning a weapon make you more or less safe?	88.6	84.2	% for Less Safe

**Table 11: Summary of WGWR conclusions on changed perceptions of human security (2002 - 2005)**

The key informant interviews revealed that, with only one exception, a strong sense of personal security both within individuals' respective villages and also outside of the villages now prevails. The following indicators were used to assess perceptions of personal security:

<sup>31</sup> Sinthay N and Ashby K. *Possibilities to Reduce the Number of Weapons and the Practice of Using Weapons to Solve Problems in Cambodia*. 1998. (Mid-point figures in the range have been quoted in the Table).

<sup>32</sup> Linter, Bertil. *Involvement of organised crime in the illicit trade in SALW in South East and East Asia*. Background Paper, Small Arms Survey, Geneva, 2002.

<sup>33</sup> Source: David de Beer, EU-ASAC Project Manager, 01 June 2006.

<sup>34</sup> Saman, Tieng, Dianna Long and Adam Platt. *Small Arms and Security in Cambodia - Changes and Challenges*. WGWR, Phnom Penh, Cambodia, December 2005.



- Informants felt confident moving freely in their village, even after dark;
- Informants felt confident travelling to remote farmland (a precondition for sustaining livelihoods);
- Informants have never seen or heard a gun that does not belong to the security forces over the last three years;
- Informants did not fear gun-related violence; and
- Informants noted that it is 'not easy' to acquire a gun, (perceptions of the availability of weapons is an important factor in perceptions of personal security).

In all target areas, however, there is a persistent problem with gang and criminal violence. Although gang members are usually not armed with weapons, and instead carry alternative weapons such as knives, it was noted by some informants, particularly those who own businesses in their village, that it would be an advantage to have a gun in the event that they were targeted for robbery.

#### 4.2.4 Effective and functioning National SALW Commission

The National Commission for the Reform and Management of Weapons and Explosives in Cambodia (NCWMR) was formed on 21 June 2000. Although the composition of the commission includes the relevant government ministries (less the Ministries of Education and Health), there is no civil society representation. More problematic is that the commission meets very infrequently, is ineffective, and has not had any impact on the development of an integrated, holistic national SALW Control strategy. It should be a priority area for the future. **Neutral Change.**

The fact that the commission is chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister (Minister of Interior), has three other Deputy Prime Ministers as members and also includes the Commander in Chief of the RCAF and Director General of the Police, means that it is unlikely that it can ever meet to discuss operational issues. It is too high level to be effective, and responsibility should be devolved to a more practical level to improve effectiveness and efficiency of the commission.

#### 4.2.5 Development and implementation of an effective National SALW Control Strategy

Although many of the elements of a National SALW Control Strategy are in place due to EU-ASAC engagement, there is no formal strategy developed in partnership with all stakeholders, and then integrated across government departments. This must become a priority for the Royal Government of Cambodia if the excellent progress made towards effective SALW Control is not to be compromised in the future. **Positive Change.**

#### 4.2.6 Implementation of appropriate and effective weapons legislation

The law on 'the Management of Weapons, Explosives and Ammunition of the Kingdom of Cambodia' (2005) and its subsidiary legislation reflects and follows international 'best practices' in terms of the principles for regulatory control of SALW.<sup>35</sup> The 2005 legislation places paramount importance on the protection of national safety and security interests by introducing very restrictive regime of SALW control. Clear legal responsibilities and the organization of arms control within the Kingdom of Cambodia are established within the legislation. **Positive Change.**

The position in terms of implementation of the law is not so clear, as effective implementation relies on a series of sub-decrees (or subsidiary regulations) to support the law and provide the detailed definitions and details necessary for enforcement. Although EU-ASAC developed drafts of these supporting instruments (sub-decrees) in November 2005, adoption and implementation has stalled to a degree. This means that the legislation is in effect unenforceable, and cannot be effectively implemented. The WGWR have initiated a public information campaign, supported by EU-ASAC, to explain the new arms law to the public. **Positive Change.**

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<sup>35</sup> For example the OSCE Best Practice Guides or SEE RMDS/G 03.20 - SALW Control and Transfers Legislation.



Whilst a Code of Conduct for law enforcement officials was conceptually developed in 2001 with the assistance of EU-ASAC, political influences and agendas within the implementing NGO had a negative impact on government acceptance. The 'Code of Conduct' eventually proposed by the NGO was conceptually realistic, but was; 1) too complicated for realistic daily use; and 2) relied on regulations and proposed legislation rather than 'behavioural issues'; it is therefore unachievable within current political constraints in its present form. It is unfinished business that has potential for the future if presented in a different manner. It is a major opportunity for future engagement in wider SSR, and should be redesigned and written to comply with the relevant best practices.<sup>36</sup> Adoption of such a Code of Conduct would make a major contribution towards reducing the alleged misuse of weapons by law enforcement officials,<sup>37</sup> make an important contribution to security sector reform, and in time further improve public confidence in the security architecture. **Neutral Change.**

#### 4.2.7 Building community awareness of the SALW problem

Whilst conducting interviews with the villagers it quickly became clear that the overriding motivation for people to hand in their weapons during the SALW collection phases was the fear of punishment for illegal possession. Additionally, informants also indicated that many villagers informed the police about other villagers possessing weapons, which suggested a desire to rid the village of weapons. The KII revealed the following insights. **Positive Change:**

THEMATIC AREA	INSIGHTS
Illegality of civilian weapon possession:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Knowledge in the community that civilians are not legally entitled to carry guns, and that there is a strict penalty for such possession; and</li> <li>A belief that civilians have no justification for owning weapons since the police are responsible for their security.</li> </ul>
Link between security and development:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>An understanding that weapons in the village breed fear of violence, and where people are too afraid to farm their land, this negatively impacts on the village's development.</li> </ul>
Risks that weapons in the community pose:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>An understanding that where weapons are kept in the house, family disputes may become dangerously violent;</li> <li>An understanding amongst female informants that children may come into contact with any weapons kept in the house; and</li> <li>An understanding that weapons are easily misused and contribute to human rights violations.</li> </ul>

**Table 12: Community awareness insights from Key Informant Interviews**

#### 4.2.8 Improved social and economic development opportunities in the EU-ASAC areas of operation

##### 4.2.8.1 National data

Regrettably quantitative data and time was unavailable to enable this indicator to be measured with any accuracy or credibility on a sub-regional or locality basis. The EU-ASAC programme alone will certainly not be directly responsible for any positive changes in social and economic development, although the programme will inevitably have made a contribution to the improvements in security that act as a major stimulant for economic growth and investment. **Positive Change.** It is possible though to identify the changes in the Cambodian economy since the initiation of the weapons control initiatives, although it must be remembered that 75% of the population still remains engaged in subsistence farming:

<sup>36</sup> **UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials**, (General Assembly Resolution 34/169 of 17 December 1979) and **UN Basic Principles for the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials**, (Adopted by the Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, Cuba, 27 August to 07 September 1990).

<sup>37</sup> See Small Arms Survey. *Stabilizing Cambodia - Small Arms Control and Security Sector Reform*. Small Arms Survey 2006, Chapter 5, pp 130 - 133. Geneva, Switzerland. Released 26 June 2006, for more background details of these allegations.





INDICATOR	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	% CHANGE (1999 - 2005)
<b>GDP (PPP) (US\$ Million)</b> <sup>38 39</sup>	3,400.0	3,651.0	3,787.0	4,079.0	4,355.0	4,888.0	5,302.0	<b>+ 55.9 %</b>
<b>GDP Growth Rate (%)</b> <sup>40</sup>	11.4	8.4	5.5	5.2	7.0	7.7	5.1	<b>7.2 %</b> (Average Annual Growth)
<b>GDP Per Capita (GPP) (US\$)</b> <sup>41</sup>	273.0	288.0	293.0	310.0	325.0	357.0	380.0	<b>+ 39.2 %</b>
<b>Gross Domestic Investment Fixed (% GDP)</b> <sup>42</sup>	15.9	13.5	17.9	16.2	16.6	17.0	22.8 <sup>43</sup>	<b>+ 43.4 %</b>
<b>Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) (US\$ Million)</b>	230.0	149.0	148.0	54.0	84.0 <sup>44</sup>	131.0 <sup>45</sup>	169.0 <sup>46</sup>	<b>- 26.5 %</b>

**Table 13: Economic growth indicators**

#### 4.2.8.2 Economic opportunities to counter corruption

EU-ASAC worked in partnership with an international NGO (Helen Keller International) to develop the concept of providing limited economic development support to the families of police officers, primarily as what would now be considered as a counter-corruption issue, but was regarded at the time as police capacity development. Although funded by the UK<sup>47</sup> outside core EU resources, the concept is imaginative and provides major opportunities for future development within a wider SSR concept, and hence deserving of conceptual analysis within this evaluation.

The EU-ASAC had determined in 2001 that one of the reasons for ineffective community based policing was the poverty levels endemic within police families, thereby leaving the police officer open to very low financial incentives for corruption.<sup>48</sup> A hypothesis was developed that if the families of police officers could be trained and supported in low-level income generation that the need for corrupt activities should reduce.

From the hypothesis, and based on previous local community income generation experience, the concept was developed in 2003 to provide specific local agricultural development support in the form of Village Model Gardens (VMG) and Village Model Poultry Farms (VMPF) to the spouses of police officers. They were provided with not only the capability to develop their own small-scale enterprises, but also the skills and resources necessary to train families to develop similar enterprises within their communities. The anticipated benefits of such an approach would be to:

<sup>38</sup> Gross Domestic Product (Purchasing Power Parity)

<sup>39</sup> Source: EIC. Cambodia Economic Watch. Oct 05. Economic Institute of Cambodia. Table A 2.1 p95.  
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCAMBODIA/Resources/CEW3.pdf>

<sup>40</sup> Ibid.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid.

<sup>42</sup> Asian Development Outlook 2003: Statistical Appendix. Statistical Notes and Tables. Table A8 - GDI. <http://www.adb.org/Documents/Books/ADO/2003/statnotes.asp>

<sup>43</sup> The World Factbook. Cambodia, 2005. <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/cb.html>

<sup>44</sup> World Investment Report 2005: Transnational Corporations and the Internationalization of R & D. Annex. Table B.1. FDI flows, by region and economy, 2002 - 2004. p 306. [http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/wir2005annexes\\_en.pdf](http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/wir2005annexes_en.pdf)

<sup>45</sup> Ibid.

<sup>46</sup> Country Analysis Cambodia. Demographic/Social, Political and Economic Environment. FDI 2005.  
<http://www.fesspore.org/pdf/Trade%20Union/Year%202005/cambodia.pdf>

<sup>47</sup> Funding for this activity was only Euro 96,000.

<sup>48</sup> The monthly average police salary of a rural based police officer within Cambodia is still only US\$ 20 per month.



- Make a contribution to police confidence by projecting the concept that their families had additional roles to support the community, based on a consensual approach to law enforcement, rather than just being seen as the instruments of state control;
- Provide food production and income generation opportunities for the whole community, led by police spouses;
- Develop a means to integrate police families as productive members of the community;
- Act as support to the development of a concept of community based policing; and primarily
- Provide additional income to police families to reduce their reliance on very low-level corruption as a necessity for family support.

The additional benefits of this type of programme, outside the pure SALW control or SSR perspectives, would be to; 1) improve the efficiency of subsistence farming; 2) broaden the diet of rural communities benefiting from such a programme; and 3) result in both increased nutrition and income for the participants.

The evaluation team travelled to one of the targeted communes for police family support.<sup>49</sup> After discussions with six police wives, three beneficiaries from the village and the NGO that carried out the training for the programme, the following insights and impacts were revealed. **Positive Change:**<sup>50</sup>

THEMATIC AREA	INSIGHTS
Police and community relations:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Villagers now come to police wives for advice on family disputes more often than they used to;</li> <li>■ Police wives play a mediating role between villagers and policemen when the former think the latter have not performed their duties; and</li> <li>■ There is increased interaction between villagers and police wives as a result of the VMPF and VMG activities.</li> </ul>
Impact on income:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Whereas prior to the project police wives spent their income on buying vegetables in the market, money can now be saved through growing their own vegetables;</li> <li>■ Police wives spend about 40 - 50% of their time working on the VMG and VMPF, which has not negatively impacted on their other farming activities; and</li> <li>■ Time is now spent more productively working on the VMPF and VMG, whereas before the project many villagers spent a lot more time with less reward, foraging for food in the forests to sustain themselves.</li> </ul>
Impact on nutrition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ The training equipped police wives and villagers with better methods for growing vegetables, which has meant that crops are considerably better than when traditional methods used to be employed.</li> </ul>

**Table 14: Social and economic insights from Key Informant Interviews**

PROJECT COMPONENT	FINDINGS	
	POLICE WIVES	VILLAGERS
Income generation	50% increase (US\$ 1.25 increase per month for 15 police wives)	Estimated 40% increase for 600 – 900 households
Improved police-community relations	<b>POSITIVE CHANGE</b>	<b>POSITIVE CHANGE</b>

**Table 15: Impact of police family support project**

<sup>49</sup> Rohah Commune in Rovieng District, Preah Vihear Province

<sup>50</sup> The evaluation team spoke with villagers from Kampot village and the police wives were working in the following four villages: Kampon, Keng, Sauke Rong and Kam Pot.



This is considered by the evaluation team to be an initially innovative, then proven concept as an activity to support security sector reform. Regrettably any future process in this concept was constrained by the lack of bi-lateral support, and therefore its effectiveness and applicability in wider environments cannot be properly analysed. However, the experience of the evaluation team, based on past experiences and to a degree emotional instinct, suggests that this concept, implemented with a degree of imagination, could have a major role to play in future SSR and CBP development programmes in appropriate environments. The limited evidence obtained during the SALW Perceptions Survey has indicated that this approach has had an impact in terms of improved perceptions of security; but these can only be sustained if the institutional and structural weaknesses within the Cambodian law enforcement agencies are addressed. Again further analytical research of this component is deemed necessary by the evaluation team, who feel that it was potentially a major missed opportunity by the international community in Cambodia.

#### 4.2.9 Summary of Outcome results

GENERIC OUTCOME AREA	RATING
A reduction in armed violence.	POSITIVE CHANGE
Reduction in, or disruption to, the illicit trade and transfer of SALW.	POSITIVE CHANGE
Improved perceptions of human security.	POSITIVE CHANGE
An effective and functioning National SALW Commission.	NEUTRAL CHANGE
Development and implementation of an effective National SALW Control Strategy.	NEUTRAL CHANGE
Implementation of appropriate and effective weapons legislation.	POSITIVE CHANGE
Building community awareness of the SALW problem.	POSITIVE CHANGE
Improved social and economic development opportunities in the EU-ASAC areas of operation.	POSITIVE CHANGE

**Table 16: Summary of outcome rating results**

#### 4.2.10 Government perceptions of programme impact

There is little doubt that the Royal Government of Cambodia consider EU-ASAC to have been a significant success in terms of providing direct support to the government for the control of weapons. Senior officials<sup>51</sup> were highly complimentary of the contribution made by EU-ASAC towards the improved stability and security in Cambodia. Their comments illustrate this, **Positive Change**:

'We were very lucky that the EU responded to our request for support'.

'EU-ASAC is seen in Cambodia as the Doctor who helped fix the people'.

'EU-ASAC stopped the cycle of circulation of weapons. We used to collect, they went to bad storage, they leaked and we collected them again'.

The Ministry of Interior provided an interesting perspective of the impact that effective SALW Control has had, which was not considered by the evaluation team during their preparation work. They stated, that in the first six-monthly figures on casualties from mines and UXO since the new Arms Law was passed, a 50% reduction in casualties has been seen. Whilst it is obviously too early to make a direct correlation between the new Arms Law and casualty reduction from UXO, the Ministry of Interior seem convinced that the fact that people now knew that they were not allowed to possess or trade in weapons, ammunition and explosives has had a significant impact on the '*extraction of explosives from ammunition for scrap metal*' trade that flourishes in some rural communities. This requires further analysis, as if true, it would be a completely unforeseen benefit, and EU-ASAC will investigate this further in their final months.

<sup>51</sup> Major General Son Kim Sorn, Director of Military Equipment, Ministry of Defence and Major General Ouk Kim Lek, Director of the Department of Weapons and Explosives, Ministry of Interior. Held on 05 June 2006.



Another indication of the impact of the EU-ASAC programme from the perspective of the Royal Government of Cambodia can be illustrated by the formal recognition of their work and commitment. The EU-ASAC team were presented with a wide range of Cambodian national honours and awards during the programme, which are at Annex H. **Positive Change.**

#### 4.2.11 Community perceptions of programme impact

The WGWR, as the leading disarmament NGO in Cambodia, certainly felt that EU-ASAC had made a major contribution to gaining effective control of illicit weapons and the improvement in perceptions of human security, (see paragraph 4.3.2). This was supported by the findings of the limited SALW Perceptions Survey (SAPS) conducted by the evaluation team, (which will be published under separate cover). **Positive Change.**

### 4.3 Capacity building and sustainability

#### 4.3.1 RCAF and Police development

The evaluation team included in the confirmatory SAPS, questions related to levels of confidence villagers had in the effectiveness of the local police. The following table lists the findings:

FINDINGS	IMPACT
Recognition of police as security providers	<b>POSITIVE CHANGE</b>
Belief in necessity of reporting crime	<b>POSITIVE CHANGE</b>
Perceived improvement in police efficiency	<b>POSITIVE CHANGE</b>

**Table 17: Villagers' confidence in the police**

All respondents were, however, unaware that the police in their respective Communes had received any training, and this could have positively contributed to perceptions held by villagers of the capacity of their local police force and thus raised expectations of, and levels of confidence in police performance.

It also emerged that although villagers rated police performance to have improved, as they did relations between the police and villagers, there were still complaints that police response to requests for assistance weren't always very rapid. This can be attributed to lack of police on the ground (as stated by most Commune Police Chiefs) and a continuing need for necessary equipment (in communication and transport). But several respondents noted that it was also necessary and not uncommon to have to pay the police for their services. One respondent even complained that the police do not always punish the perpetrators so when they return to the village they seek revenge on the individual who reported them. Replicating the police family support project (detailed in section 4.2.8.2) elsewhere would certainly have alleviated this problem.

#### 4.3.2 CSO and NGO development

Cooperation with civil society and the development of NGO capacity was a consistent requirement of the EU-ASAC mandate under the Joint Action. EU-ASAC therefore engaged with civil society in three major areas; 1) consultation on the development of SALW policy and legislation; 2) WfD implementation partnerships; and 3) cooperation in SALW Awareness activities.

The development of the new 'Arms Laws' was undertaken with full transparency and consultation with civil society and in particular the Working Group for Weapons Reduction (WGWR). Consultation with civil society on new legislation is not yet common practice in Cambodia, and it is primarily due to the efforts of EU-ASAC that civil society advice to the National Assembly and Senate in April/May 2005 gained support for the legislative process that resulted in the promulgation of the new national 'Arms Law'. **Positive Change.**



The partnership with NGOs for the implementation of the development incentives to support weapons collection during 2001 - 2003 was an important component in their success, as it made a major contribution to community perspectives and support. Local NGOs were used to construct and repair water wells. Generally this was successful, although some of the NGOs had problems meeting the necessary development or design 'standards'. This risk had already been identified, as it was considered that some NGOs would lack the capacity for efficient project implementation, but a risk management process was implemented in order to try and allow the NGOs to develop capacity and to stimulate NGO cooperation with local authorities . **Positive Change.**

Two of the NGOs that were involved in SALW awareness activities, one of which conducted the training for the police family support project,<sup>52</sup> stated the following gains in terms of organisational capacity and employee capability:

PROJECT ACTIVITY	BENEFITS (ORGANISATION)	BENEFITS (EMPLOYEE)	RATING
SALW Awareness	Recognition and credibility from the local authorities. <sup>53</sup>	Recognition and credibility from the Local Authorities.	<b>POSITIVE CHANGE</b>
	Enhanced trust amongst villagers.	Skills in project management and budgeting, as well as weapons collection strategies.	<b>POSITIVE CHANGE</b>
		Knowledge of weapons law, weapons issues and information dissemination strategies.	<b>POSITIVE CHANGE</b>
Police wife training (VMG and VMPF)	Credibility for future projects.	Knowledge of nutrition education, VMG and VMPF.	<b>POSITIVE CHANGE</b>
		Skills on training trainers.	<b>POSITIVE CHANGE</b>

**Table 18: Increase in the capacity of local NGOs**

In addition, NGO involvement had the advantage of monitoring the work of the police both in terms of recognition for the police's good work and to ensure that no individuals were threatened or punished when voluntarily surrendering weapons. As such, NGOs played a pivotal role in encouraging individuals to surrender their weapons.

During the initial stages of EU-ASAC engagement the Working Group for Weapons Reduction (WGWR) was a network of a wide range of NGOs that engaged to some degree or another in SALW related activities. However, with the support of EU-ASAC, WGWR has evolved into an NGO in its own right that engages exclusively on SALW and Armed Violence Prevention issues. The Executive Director of WGWR considers that EU-ASAC has had the following impact on WGWR:

- Contributed to an improvement of the networking capability leading to WGWR evolving into an NGO;
- Provided needed technical advice on SALW awareness;
- Facilitated NGO access to government, leading to partnership;
- Provided much needed financial support to operational SALW Awareness activities; and
- Improved visibility of the SALW issue, thereby preparing the ground for wider NGO engagement.

WGWR are concerned that the completion of the EU-ASAC mandate may lead the international community to conclude that the SALW issue has been completed in Cambodia. Whilst this is true in terms of bringing the

<sup>52</sup> NGO PhnomSrey Association for Development (PSAD) conducted SALW awareness activities in Kampong Cham and NGO Takmeo Community for Development of Agriculture and Industry (TCAID) conducted both SALW awareness activities and training for police wives as part of the police family support project in Preah Vihear. The evaluation team conducted interviews with both the Directors of the NGO and field staff who worked during the project's implementation.

<sup>53</sup> This was confirmed by remarks from District and Provincial authorities.





conflict weapons under control, as a post-conflict activity, WGWR emphasised that there were still significant SALW issues remaining in terms of the criminal use of weapons and armed violence.

## 4.4 Synergies and coordination

One of the consistent mandated tasks of EU-ASAC was to support project implementation by other donors and, by implication, to ensure coordination between SALW Control stakeholders. This was a time intensive task, which committed considerable human resources to developing and maintaining the necessary relationships. As a result the cooperation and synergy between different stakeholders was usually good throughout the programme life.

### Positive Change.

### 4.4.1 World Food Programme (WFP)

The evaluation of this particular synergistic component is the one that has caused the evaluation team the most thought, and some concern in regard to perceptions of conditionality. A WfD activity was developed in partnership with the WFP, during 2001 - 2002 in Kratie (Snuol) and Pursat (Bakan), based on the concept that an incentive for the community as a whole to surrender weapons would result in much needed food for the community. In effect, weapons surrendered by the community resulted in work opportunities for food (rice) for the whole community to build effective access routes (roads). The results in terms of community social and economic development can be illustrated by the fact that the journey time from Phnom Penh to Snuol was reduced from 1.5 days to approximately 4 hours, with the obvious impact on social and living conditions that this enabled. Funding for this development work was provided by the WFP, working in partnership with EU-ASAC, and resulted in 121 tonnes of rice been provided in return for 6.85 kilometres of road in Pursat, and 100 tonnes of rice for 5 sections of road in Kratie.

This is probably one of the first examples of the real operational mainstreaming of SALW Control interventions that has had a visible impact within wider humanitarian or development projects. Yet little visibility or analysis was paid at the time (2002) and lessons that could be identified are now difficult to develop in retrospect for future implementation. Indeed the evaluation team is not yet convinced of the future applications of this activity in a wider global perspective, although the opportunities are obvious, if possibly controversial.

The concept was based on individuals surrendering weapons as part of a real wider community need for humanitarian aid in the form of food. Once weapons were surrendered the community had 'earned' the right to build much-needed access roads in return for food. At a first analytical view, this projects an image of 'conditional development', but this was certainly not the institutional perspective of the WFP at the time. The need for food for these communities was obvious, and WFP support in the form of rice would inevitably have been forthcoming anyway. Notwithstanding this, liaison or synergy between the two programmes, (WFP and EU-ASAC), was identified, which resulted in food delivery for voluntary weapons surrender. There was literally no other development or humanitarian aid available in Snuol at that time, and there is certainly little doubt that the community as a whole had themselves linked the voluntary surrender of weapons to road building, and hence food. Whilst the WFP had made no direct conditional linkage between weapons surrender, development work and food, the perceptions of the community were probably very different. This is both an operational and moral issue that requires much more analysis and is outside the time and space limitations of the evaluation team to pursue in more analytical detail. The inevitable conclusion that interventions at the time resulted in; 1) much needed food being supplied to all individuals; 2) the access roads built by community members have had a very positive impact on economic development within that community; 3) weapons were surrendered, put beyond use or stigmatised within that society; and 4) perceptions of human security have been much improved, is unarguable. What needs to be resolved is the perception of a concept of, or indeed a possible future for, conditional community disarmament under very specific circumstances. Future operational research is required. Finally if any defence is needed for this particular *humanitarian or development* activity, it must be placed in the context that armed military and police were required to provide protection during the intervention at that time; there is now no need for that sort of response to protect the development work that is still conducted in the area.

In terms of the EU-ASAC intervention, '*guns for roads for food*', in partnership with the WFP, was certainly a success within the very limited geographical area in which it was implemented at that time. A precedence



had been set within Cambodia at that time, and it is very likely that had EU-ASAC had the external bi-lateral donor support to be able to continue with their larger WfD activities post 2002, that this type of '*conditional development*, could have been explored, (*or even exploited*), further within certain communities in Cambodia.

#### 4.4.2 Japanese Assistance Team for Small Arms Management in Cambodia (JSAC)

From 2000 - 2002 the EU-ASAC programme was a good example of how effective coordination by a lead organization, with technical competence and good government liaison, can maximize the coherence and impact of international support. Japan initially chose to provide their funding support to the EU-ASAC programme in 2001. However, in 2003 the Government of Japan established a parallel programme (JSAC) that directly replicated the EU-ASAC programmes within areas that they had identified through their previous support. JSAC have tried to follow the successful EU-ASAC methodology, and indeed even use the same storage building designs, technical procedures for stockpile management and computer software developed by EU-ASAC. Yet JSAC still lack the technical knowledge within their team necessary for really effective replication. Although JSAC chose to operate in different provinces (in the north-east of the country) and focused on the police, it was still not a particularly helpful approach in terms of a wider international community approach to coordination and cooperation. An effective response was already in place, which the Government of Japan had financially supported, yet for their own political reasons they chose to establish a separate project. Although one of the JSAC team had worked previously with EU-ASAC, they still did not appear to have the operational experience or breadth of technical knowledge to work from first principles, and hence their technical capability to respond to changing dynamics on the ground has been very limited.

From Box 5 it can be seen that whilst EU-ASAC was concentrating on the delivery of counter-proliferation measures (2003 - 2005), and NGO managed micro-WfD activities (2003 only), the focus of JSAC was on large-scale WfD activities. This is a surprising decision as both the Government of Cambodia and EU-ASAC had by then the evidence and indicators to suggest that NGO managed small-scale WfD activities targeted at specific communities would have more impact, and would certainly be more cost effective in terms of cost per weapon surrendered. Large-scale WfD activities in Cambodia at that time had a number of disadvantages;

- Community participation was limited;
- They were too management intensive;
- They were geographically constrained and lacked flexibility to respond to other community approaches for WfD activities within a realistic timeframe;
- They were generally regarded as development work and not SALW control activities;
- The concept of '*conditional development*' within the WFP partnership had not been fully explored; and
- The distribution of weapons after all the previous SALW collection work (1998 - 2002) perhaps could not really justify a large-scale WfD approach in terms of efficiency or cost benefits in terms of pure SALW control, (See paragraph 4.2.2 for background).

Box 5: Effectiveness (Outputs) (2003 - 2005)		
	EU-ASAC	JSAC <sup>54</sup>
Budget (Euro)	4,380,518	3,180,000
Weapons Destroyed	62,377	15,646
Weapons Depots Constructed	32	3
Weapons Placed in Secure Storage	117,570	6,132
Weapons Collected	1,014 (2003 Only)	11,662
Weapons Caches Cleared	9	0
Incentive Delivery (Schools Built)	0	10
Incentive Delivery (Water Wells)	200	28
Incentive Delivery (Roads) (Km)	0	27
Incentive Delivery (Bridges)	0	1

It would therefore not be unreasonable to conclude that whereas EU-ASAC was primarily a SALW control programme using limited development as incentives, it can be argued that JSAC is still primarily a development programme that used SALW as the entry point. Although JSAC have begun engagement with the Police on the development of safe storage, the Ministry of Interior consider that progress is still slow. JSAC has benefited from access to the technical knowledge and experience of the EU-ASAC team, but it is difficult to see how JSAC can

<sup>54</sup> Source: <http://www.online.com.kh/~adm.jsac/topENG.html>. Other minor incentives included Ponds, Toilets and Agricultural Training.



sustain effective SALW Control, as opposed to development,<sup>55</sup> operations in the post-EU-ASAC period when this knowledge base is lost to them.

#### 4.4.3 Coordination with the EU Delegation (Cambodia)

When the EU-ASAC programme started on the ground in 2000 the EU had a Technical Cooperation Office (TCO) in Phnom Penh, which only became a Delegation on December 2001. The Head of Delegation is accredited and based in Bangkok, with the Phnom Penh office under the control of a Charge d'Affairs. The EU-ASAC project manager has maintained close liaison links with the other EU initiatives, but as neither the Commissions' Country Strategy <sup>56</sup> paper (2000 - 2003) and the National Indicative Programme (NIP) <sup>57</sup> (2005 - 2006) included either SALW Control or SSR in their planned activities closer cooperation with other EU activities in Cambodia was not possible.

Although little formal cooperation between the EU Mission and EU-ASAC activities was possible, due to the differing priorities of engagement, there is little doubt that the EU-ASAC programme has made a significant contribution to improving the visibility of the EU within Cambodia. The programme has been supported at the highest political levels within the Royal Government of Cambodia, with weapons destruction activities been attended by a range of government ministers, (including the Prime Minister). The programme is also well known at community level within Cambodia, and is considered by the international SALW community as one of the pioneering activities at the operational level.

#### 4.4.4 Disarmament Forum

The Disarmament Forum is a framework for information exchange between organizations working on SALW Control related issues within Cambodia. EU-ASAC, JCCP, JSAC and WGWR are members. Meetings are held on a regular basis, and are mainly intended to try and ensure deconfliction of responses, although issues such as 'technical standards' are also raised.

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<sup>55</sup> No opinion was formed by the evaluation team of either the cost effectiveness or the efficiency of the JSAC development components.

<sup>56</sup> Activities included trade infrastructure, customs procedures, tariffs and NGO support in agro-business. Conflict resolution activities under the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights were also covered.

<sup>57</sup> The priorities of the NIP are pro-poor economic growth, social sector support and governance. As the governance priority targeted the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MoEF), there was little opportunity for synergy with EU-ASAC activities.



## 5 Programme management

### 5.1 General

The Joint Action of 1999 to support the Royal Government of Cambodia in SALW Control issues was essentially a political decision under the CFSP. This resulted in the appointment of a Special Advisor to the European Commission, who also acted as the Project Manager. This differs significantly to development projects, which are usually determined on the basis of a country strategy paper (written by EC officials in consultation with the government concerned).

The appointment of a Special Advisor to implement the Joint Action meant that EU-ASAC did not follow typical development cooperation procedures, and therefore differed from typical European external aid programmes. The Special Advisor was provided with appropriate flexibility to respond to the political, security and operational dynamics on the ground and to make recommendations to CODUN on the detailed activities of EU-ASAC for the next funding year. This proved to be an effective system, which allowed the delivery of capability based on the then identified needs, balanced against available resources, and based on best technical and operational practices. As SALW Control was still a very new concept at the inception of the EU-ASAC programme, and there were virtually no 'best practices' or international standards to base the programme on, the flexibility allowed to the programme was essential if it was to be able to respond to lessons learned on the ground. The programme would succeed or fail depending on the experience, judgement and technical knowledge of the EU-ASAC team. The disadvantage of the approach was the need for the project manager to operate within an annual funding cycle.

The fact that EU-ASAC employed experienced specialists in each of the project component across their range of activities meant that appropriate responses could be developed from first principles, and then tested (if necessary) during 'pilot projects'. Specific components were developed that were **Achievable, Measurable and Verifiable**, rather than as broad aspirations. The quality of the programme staff, relying on competent specialists<sup>58 59</sup> for the component parts, rather than generalists, was one of the keys to the success of the programme. It also ensured that EU-ASAC fulfilled its 'Duty of Care' in ensuring that the inherent risks in the collection and storage of weapons, ammunition and explosives were reduced to a 'tolerable' level (as defined in ISO Guide 51 - Safety).

### 5.2 Annual funding cycle

There is a range of evidence to suggest that the implementation of an annual funding cycle constrained the developmental components of the programme. Not only is it difficult to negotiate, develop and implement individual large-scale Weapons for Development components, whilst complying with international standards of tendering and procurement, within a calendar year, but it also leads to a reduction in potential impacts. Annual funding cycles do not take account of the influence of factors such as weather, access to the terrain, political developments (such as elections), capability of national counterparts to work within programme timelines etc. There is great pressure of the programme team to deliver capability within the year, and it makes identification of synergies with other projects, and the development and implementation of longer term strategies much more difficult. For a programme team to commit to activities beyond the funding cycle runs the great risk of raising expectations, which cannot then be subsequently met.

In the case of EU-ASAC there is little doubt that the annual funding cycle did constrain their capability in terms of the large-scale WfD component, but it is the opinion of the evaluation team that this was more than offset by the flexibility of operational response allowed under the Special Advisor system of programme management.

<sup>58</sup> Competent in this context refers to 'competence'. An individual's 'competence' to perform a task is based on a combination of their training, education and operational experience. Just because an individual has 20 years experience in a task area does not necessarily equate to 'competence', as their initial training may have been flawed.

<sup>59</sup> The EU-ASAC programme employed internationally qualified and experienced specialists in Weapons, Ammunition and Explosives Management, Explosive Ordnance Disposal and Law.





## 5.3 Financial issues

### 5.3.1 Costs (2000 - 2005)

The EU-ASAC programme budget and independently audited expenditure<sup>60</sup> for the EU-ASAC programme (2000 - 2005) against thematic activities is summarised in Table 19. The remaining financial period from January - September 2006<sup>61</sup> was still ongoing at the time of the evaluation, but will be subject to an independent external audit, and the indicators are that a similar financial profile can be expected, (a predicted expenditure summary is at Annex G.

EXPENSES	BUDGET (€)	EXPENDITURE (€)	EXPENDITURE <sup>62</sup> (%)	REMARKS
<b>1. Human Resources</b>				
1.1 International Staff	€ 2,085,024	€ 1,895,765	31.1 %	
1.2 National Staff	€ 373,711	€ 319,579	5.3 %	
1.3 Insurance Costs	€ 85,568	€ 56,672	0.9 %	
<b>Sub Total (1)</b>	<b>€ 2,544,303</b>	<b>€ 2,272,016</b>	<b>37.0%</b>	
<b>2. Travel Costs</b>	€ 320,509	€ 209,157	3.4 %	
<b>3. Operational / Administration Costs</b>	€ 396,901	€ 309,397	5.1 %	
<b>Sub Total (2 - 3)</b>	<b>€ 717,410</b>	<b>€ 518,554</b>	<b>8.5 %</b>	
<b>4. Operational Components</b>				
4.1 Legislative and Regulatory	€ 116,548	€ 33,124	0.15 %	
4.2 Weapons for Development (Large)	€ 627,000	€ 415,439	6.8 %	
4.3 Weapons for Development (NGO)	€ 658,236	€ 440,369	7.2 %	
4.4 SALW Collection (Weapons Caches)	€ 105,000	€ 32,983	0.5 %	€ 52.86 per weapon (For 624 weapons) <sup>63</sup>
4.4 Weapons Destruction	€ 523,885	€ 338,697	5.6 %	€ 2.65 per weapon (For 127,766 weapons)
4.5.1 Stockpile Management and Security (RCAF)	€ 1,585,964	€ 1,410,503	23.2 %	€ 10.83 per weapon (For 151,614 weapons)
4.5.1 Stockpile Management and Security (Police)	€ 254,900	€ 231,098	3.8 %	
4.6 SALW Awareness and CSO Development	€ 491,804	€ 381,818	6.3 %	
4.7 Police Capacity Development	€ 0	€ 0	0 %	Funded entirely from external donations.
<b>Sub Total (4)</b>	<b>€ 4,390,337</b>	<b>€ 3,284,031</b>	<b>53.9 %</b>	
<b>5. Contingencies</b>	€ 284,960	€ 14,595	0.2 %	
<b>6. Totals</b>	<b>€ 7,937,010</b>	<b>€6,089,196</b>	<b>100.0 %</b>	
<b>7. Balance</b>		€ 1,847,814	<b>23.3 % of Budget</b>	Expenditure (Delivery) was 76.7% of Budget.

**Table 19: EU-ASAC Expenditure Summary**

<sup>60</sup> This matrix only includes EU funding donations. Additional resources mobilized have been reported on to the individual donors.

<sup>61</sup> Including closing down period of July - September 2006.

<sup>62</sup> Rounded as appropriate to one decimal place.

<sup>63</sup> This expenditure also covers the costs of ammunition destruction, the training in offensive search and seizure methodologies and the provision of search capability for the RCAF and Police. Operational costs for the recovery of future weapons from caches, (per weapon), will be much less as this figure includes the initial training and 'start up' costs.





### 5.3.2 Benefits

One financial benefit of the programme is that over € 4.8 million (78%) of the expended funds<sup>64</sup> were injected directly into the Cambodian economy.

It can be estimated that the income generated for both villagers and police wives as a result of the VMPF and VMG activities has increased by between 40 - 50%. The average disposable income in the targeted villages per household used to be approximately €1 per month, so for 15 police families and between 600 and 900 village households, the total income generated for all beneficiaries from this project since its implementation has been approximately € 615 and € 915 per month. This may seem insignificant in European terms, but represents a major injection of income for the families concerned in a country where 75% of the population are still reliant on subsistence farming for survival.

### 5.3.3 Value Added Tax (VAT)

The project was not registered as an official foreign organisation and could therefore not reclaim VAT (at the rate of 10%) on items purchased. However, it operated as an international organisation and therefore was not charged VAT for major items such as construction work for weapons depots. The estimated cost to the project was therefore minimal.

### 5.3.4 Additional resources mobilized

The funding arrangements for EU-ASAC under the auspices of the CFSP budget had an expectation that the core funds allocated under CFSP would be complemented by individual contributions from Member States. For example the WfD funding for the activities in Bakan and Snoul districts was allocated on the understanding that additional funds would be provided by other donors. The programme was, to a degree, successful in the mobilization of resources from other external donors to support project components, (Table 20). (This equates to an additional 14.8% to the EU budgeted funding).<sup>65</sup>

DATES	VALUE (€) <sup>65</sup>	DONOR	PROJECT COMPONENTS	PROVINCES
2000	16,100	UK	▪ Support to 'Code of Conduct' development conference.	▪ Phnom Penh
2001	28,531	Canada	▪ Support for police training	▪ Various
2001	150,336	Japan	▪ Support for WfD	▪ Pursat
2001	363,025	Netherlands	▪ Support for WfD	▪ Kratie
2002	80,500	Germany	▪ Support for police capacity development	▪ Pursat
2003	80,500	Germany	▪ Support to police community training.	▪ Various
2003	250,000	Netherlands	▪ Support to SALW Stockpile Management	▪ Siem Reap (MR 4)
2003	77,280	UK	▪ UK support for CBP.	▪ Preah Vihear
2004	222,366	Netherlands	▪ Support to SALW Stockpile Management	▪ Kampong Speu (MR 3)
<b>Sub-Total</b>	<b>1,089,771</b>	<i>(EU Member States)</i>		
<b>Sub-Total</b>	<b>178,876</b>	<i>(Non- EU States)</i>		
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1,268,638</b>			

**Table 20: Summary of additional resources mobilized by the EU-ASAC programme**

<sup>64</sup> Based on the assumption that approximately 30% of international staff salaries would be spent within Cambodia.

<sup>65</sup> Currencies converted at May 2006 UN Exchange rate of \$ 1.00 = € 0.8050, and CA \$ = € 0.6993.



Resource mobilization was however complicated by the fact that only two of the traditional SALW donors had a major diplomatic presence in Cambodia, (Germany and UK), with the remainder been located in Bangkok. As a travel budget was not allocated to the Project Manager specifically for resource mobilization issues, (other than regular reporting to CODUN in Brussels), it was difficult to make the necessary personal approaches to donors that are so valuable in terms of securing funding.

## 5.4 Quality Assurance (QA) systems

### 5.4.1 Monitoring<sup>66</sup> and verification<sup>67</sup> issues

Although the programme has been the subject of a number of assessments by academic institutions and NGOs, there have been no structured progress or mid-term evaluations during the period of the programme. Notwithstanding this, a stringent reporting mechanism was instituted by the EU, which required a formal annual report, regular cooperation with local embassies/missions of EU Member States and that the programme manager personally reported to the Working Group on Global Arms Control and Disarmament (CODUN) in the Council of Ministers. The programme was therefore under effective political scrutiny of the EU member States, but no formal monitoring systems were implemented to measure project efficiency or verification systems to identify outcomes during its life.

### 5.4.2 Financial probity

The following independent financial audits of the EU-ASAC programme have taken place, and copies forwarded to the EU. No major issues were identified:

DATE	AUDITORS	MAJOR FINDINGS
15 Nov 01	Morison Kak and Associés	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No major issues of non-compliance identified related to the use of funds, payroll documentation, contractual procedures or control of fixed assets.</li> <li>A number of observations were made relating to internal and management controls, which were all satisfactorily resolved during the next accounting period.</li> </ul>
31 Dec 02	Morison Kak & Associés	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No significant observations.</li> </ul>
31 Dec 03	Morison Kak & Associés	
31 Dec 04	Morison Kak & Associés	
31 Dec 05	Morison Kak & Associés	
30 Sep 06	Morison Kak & Associés	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To be conducted.</li> </ul>

**Table 21: Independent audits of the EU-ASAC programme**

<sup>66</sup> In the context of SALW Control, the term refers to 'the authorised observation by qualified personnel of sites, activities or processes without taking responsibility for that being observed. This is usually carried out to check conformity with undertakings, procedures or standard practice and often includes recording and reporting elements'.

<sup>67</sup> Confirmation, through the provision of objective evidence that specified requirements have been fulfilled. [ISO 9000:2000]



## 6 Conclusions and ‘Lessons Identified’

### 6.1 Impact

EU-ASAC has had a major impact in sustaining the momentum of the Royal Government of Cambodia on SALW Control issues, which has led to much improved stability within the country. Their work has resulted in the implementation of good standards of safety and security, supported by appropriate legislation and procedures. The political support of the Royal Government of Cambodia, the development of activities in partnership with government and communities, combined with the high technical and professional competence of the EU-ASAC team were all major contributory factors in the success of the programme. This has all been achieved at a relatively modest financial cost, and illustrates the positive impact on security and stability that well-managed and targeted SALW Control interventions can have.

Objective evidence suggests that of the estimated number of weapons in circulation in 1991, over 82% have been brought under effective government control or destroyed. As a result the risks of proliferation, leakages or export of surpluses to inappropriate clients have all reduced significantly.

Community and individual perceptions of human security have improved to such a degree that over 87% of people feel safer now than they did three years ago, although they are still worried about armed violence and crime. Homicides using firearms have reduced by 70%. This improvement in both perceived and real security has acted as a stimulant for economic growth. Since 1999, GDP (PPP) has increased by 55%, GDI by 43% and GDP per capita by 39%.

Armed violence is regrettably still a factor within Cambodian society, primarily with the continued criminal and gang use of weapons, and the use of knives is now emerging as the primary tool of household violence and low-level criminal activity. There is now a growing perception within communities that perhaps it may again be useful for them to possess a weapon for self-protection. This is not a positive development, and the international community and the Royal Government of Cambodia should investigate measures to target armed violence and criminal gangs if the major achievements made to date in the control of weapons are not to be placed at risk.

The law on ‘the Management of Weapons, Explosives and Ammunition of the Kingdom of Cambodia’ was adopted by the National Assembly and Senate during 2005, and reflects international ‘best practices’ in terms of the principles for regulatory control of SALW. Yet the effective implementation of certain aspects relies on a series of sub-decrees, which have not been adopted. The law is therefore, partially unenforceable at the moment.

The EU-ASAC programme has also had an impact outside Cambodia in terms of the development of ‘best practices’ and methodologies for the wider SALW community. Many of their techniques have been included in international and regional DDR and SALW Control standards and guidelines.

### 6.2 Programme development and management

The programme documentation did not always clearly identify results in terms of ‘impact’, and progress towards those results was hence difficult to measure both quantitatively and qualitatively. Impact data is difficult to collect in Cambodia, and although in an ideal world support to the Royal Government of Cambodia in developing data collection and collation mechanisms would be highly desirable, the reality is that this could be a 10 year project in its own right; more resources would be committed to developing data mechanisms than in the practical SALW Control components on the ground.

The programme was highly effective in terms of the delivery of ‘technical components’, but the principles of ‘results based management’, if formally adopted at the outset could have resulted in more effective monitoring



systems to measure detailed 'impact' throughout the programme, rather than the subjective assessment that took place. This would have enabled the project team to make management decisions based on 'impact' indicators rather than their subjective assessment. A positive aspect, however, was that programme development was a participatory process that involved substantial consultation with local and government counterparts and partners.

Notwithstanding that a results based management concept was not used as a primary means of focusing on component deliverables and impacts, the principles of the project management cycle<sup>68</sup> were followed by the programme team.

The adoption of an annual funding mechanism constrained the ability of the EU-ASAC programme to deliver long-term WfD strategies, or to engage in any longer term activities to control weapons within Cambodia. It is now generally accepted that impact of SALW Control programmes are mid- to long-term in nature and therefore should be supported by multi-year funding mechanisms. (Indeed the very success of EU-ASAC shows the impact that sustainable funding can have - but it can be more efficiently and effectively committed if allocated on a multi-year basis).

## 6.3 Future synergies and needs

### 6.3.1 Armed Violence Prevention (AVP) and SALW Control

Although the link between armed violence and weapons was identified during the project conception phase, EU-ASAC was not mandated to engage in crime prevention related issues. This is primarily because the funding was allocated under the EU Joint Action on SALW, which is specifically focused on areas such as collection, destruction, stockpile management, legislation etc. Therefore no activities, such as the development of a weapons intelligence capability etc, were included to target the criminal use of weapons. Experience gained on other SALW Control interventions now suggests that this is an important component of a holistic SALW control strategy, and future EU supported interventions should also consider this component during programme development.

### 6.3.2 Security Sector Reform

Similarly the synergies between some of the more 'technical' aspects of SALW Control, such as SALW destruction and stockpile management, also support wider security sector reform (SSR). SALW Control offers an entry point to wider SSR, of which much remains to be done in Cambodia on police reform and capacity development.

Of particular concern is the safety, security and control of the ammunition stockpiles within Cambodia. EU-ASAC was not mandated to engage on wider ammunition issues, although they have identified the threat and future options.<sup>69</sup> There are estimated to be over 100,000 tonnes of ammunition present in Cambodia, the vast majority of which is stored in unsafe and insecure conditions. It presents a real security threat, which could negate all the good work done implementing the control of the weapons, which can easily be operationally replaced by self-contained rocket launchers, detonators and explosives, thereby increasing the threshold of violence during any future periods of political instability, terrorist or criminal activities. The ammunition stockpiles also pose a significant humanitarian threat to the safety of local communities; and there have been explosions at ammunition depots caused by stockpile instability<sup>70</sup> resulting in six fatalities and 20 injured. It is inevitable that there will be many more unless this problem is addressed as a matter of priority.

<sup>68</sup> 1) Identification of problems and opportunities; 2) Programme and component design; 3) Programme and component implementation; and 4) Evaluation of results and programme redesign.

<sup>69</sup> Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Adrian Sprangmeijer. *Improved Safe Storage of Ammunition and Explosives for the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces - A Feasibility Study*. EU-ASAC. Phnom Penh. June 2006.

<sup>70</sup> 29 August 1999 - Ream, and 31 March 2005 - Andong Chen, Battambang.



## 7 Recommendations

The establishment of EU-ASAC as a Joint Action under the daily operational management of a Special Advisor has many advantages in terms of the ability of a programme to respond to changing security, political and economic dynamics on the ground. This flexibility is important for SALW Control interventions because of their need to engage in the development, security and humanitarian sectors. The EU should consider this approach for future SALW Control programmes in support of national governments, where appropriate.

Balanced against the above recommendation is the need for longer funding cycles. The EU should consider funding cycles of two years or more for future SALW Control programmes.

Future SALW Control programmes of the EU should not constrain themselves to just specific functional areas of SALW Control such as weapons collection or weapons destruction. They should be provided with the mandate and capability to engage in all areas of SALW Control, as holistic and integrated strategies and responses are more efficient, effective and have longer-term impact.

Further SALW Control support is still needed by the Royal Government of Cambodia, particularly in terms of; 1) legislation implementation; 2) the development of an effective National SALW Commission and National SALW Control Strategy; 3) activities to address armed violence as a social and development issue; 4) the implementation of an effective Code of Conduct to ensure police compliance with international best practices;<sup>71</sup> 5) improvement of police capability to tackle the criminal use of weapons; 6) the development of democratic oversight mechanisms to support SALW Control measures; 7) the development of safe and secure ammunition storage and management systems; and 8) the disposal of thousands of tonnes of surplus or unsafe ammunition. The international community should address this as a matter of priority if the achievements to date are to be sustained.

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<sup>71</sup> **UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials**, (General Assembly Resolution 34/169 of 17 December 1979) and **UN Basic Principles for the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials**, (Adopted by the Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, Cuba, 27 August to 07 September 1990).





## Annexes:

- A. Evaluation Results Matrix - Legislative and Regulatory (Outputs)
- B. Evaluation Results Matrix - SALW (Weapons) Collection (Outputs)
- C. Evaluation Results Matrix - SALW (Weapons) Destruction (Outputs)
- D. Evaluation Results Matrix - Stockpile Management and Security (Outputs)
- E. Evaluation Results Matrix - SALW Awareness and CSO Development (Outputs)
- F. Evaluation Results Matrix - Police Capacity Development (Outputs)
- G. EU-ASAC Predicted Expenditure Summary (2006)
- H. EU-ASAC Honours and Awards
- J. Individuals Consulted
- K. Bibliography



## Annex A - Evaluation Results Matrix - Legislation and Regulatory (Outputs)

OUTPUTS	OUTPUT INDICATORS	RESULT SUMMARY	RATING
Development of appropriate and effective weapons legislation. Above	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Effective arms control, export and transfers legislation drafted.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Draft 'Arms Law' developed by EU-ASAC and tabled by Council of Ministers in December 2001. (Lapsed in 2003).</li> <li>Draft 'Arms Law' updated by EU-ASAC tabled by Council of Ministers on 31 January 2005.</li> <li>Sub-decrees to support national legislation developed by EU-ASAC and submitted to the Mol on 24 November 2005.</li> </ul>	ACHIEVED
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Arms control legislation adopted by parliament and brought onto the national statute.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Draft 'Arms Law' approved by Council of Ministers on 18 May 2002. (Lapsed in 2003).</li> <li>Draft 'Arms Law' the Prime Minister submitted to National Assembly on 10 October 2002. (Lapsed in 2003).</li> <li>Draft 'Arms Law' approved by Council of Ministers on 04 February 2005.</li> <li>'Arms Law' passed by the National Assembly on 28 April 2005 and by the Senate on 12 May 2005.</li> <li>Sub-decrees developed by EU-ASAC, but still to be adopted to support full implementation of the legislation.</li> </ul>	ACHIEVED
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Reduction in number of weapons related offences.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Firearm homicide has declined dramatically from 4.0 - 5.4 per 100,000 in 1998 to 1.1 - 1.7 in 2003.</li> <li>The overall homicide rate has dropped from 6.9 - 9.0 per 100,000 in 1998 to 3.1 - 4.0 in 2003.<sup>72</sup></li> </ul>	ACHIEVED
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Effective legislation to control Private Security Company (PSC) activities.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Arms Law forbids PSC's to carry SALW.</li> </ul>	ACHIEVED
Development of an effective National SALW Commission and SALW Control Strategy.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Formation of a National SALW Commission</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The National Commission for the Reform and Management of Weapons and Explosives in Cambodia (NCWMR) was formed on 21 June 2000.</li> </ul>	PARTIAL
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Development and implementation of a National SALW Control Strategy.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Although many of the elements of a National SALW Control Strategy are in place due to EU-ASAC engagement, there is no formal strategy integrated across government departments.</li> </ul>	NOT ACHIEVED

<sup>72</sup> Wille, Christina. Finding the evidence: the links between weapon collection programmes, gun use, and homicide rates in Cambodia. Small Arms Survey, Geneva, 24 April 2006 (Draft).



## Annex B - Evaluation Results Matrix - SALW (Weapons) Collection (Outputs)

OUTPUTS	OUTPUT INDICATORS	RESULT SUMMARY	RATING
<b>Safe and effective SALW (Weapons) collection.</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Number of weapons collected.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Pursat (2001/2) - 2,656 weapons collected</li> <li>Kratie (2001/2) - 3,379 weapons collected</li> <li>Kampong Thom (2001) - 2,700 weapons collected (NGO OKFDA Execution)</li> <li>Mini WFD Projects (2002/3) - 4,040 weapons</li> <li>TOTAL - 12,775 weapons collected</li> <li>Ammunition - 43,216 rounds</li> </ul>	<b>ACHIEVED</b>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Cost (US \$) per weapon collected.<sup>73</sup></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>\$ 121.62 per weapon (Large WFD Projects) (6,035 weapons @ US\$ 733,949).</li> <li>\$ 41.54 per weapon (Mini WFD Projects) (4,040 weapons @ US\$ 167,824).</li> </ul>	<b>N/A</b>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Number of casualties during weapon collection process.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>None known or recorded</li> <li>WGW (NGO) produced a SALW Collection and Destruction Manual to enhance safety (2001).</li> </ul>	<b>ACHIEVED</b>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Variance in 'street price' of weapons in targeted areas.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>440% Increase (1998 - 2006) (Assault Rifle)</li> <li>750% Increase (1998 - 2006) (Pistol)</li> </ul>	<b>ACHIEVED</b>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Delivery of development components in exchange for weapons surrendered.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>8 x Schools Constructed/repared (6/2)</li> <li>275 x Water Wells</li> <li>4 x Bridges</li> <li>1 x Health Post</li> </ul>	<b>ACHIEVED</b>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Technical support provided for the location and safe clearance of weapons caches and 'hides'</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Support provided for clearance of 9 caches</li> <li>624 weapons recovered</li> <li>1,705 rounds of ammunition recovered</li> </ul>	<b>ACHIEVED</b>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Community members' perceptions of the impact of weapons reduction.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Experience of weapons misuse is now very rare.</li> <li>Weapons availability is perceived to be almost non-existent in rural communities.</li> </ul>	<b>ACHIEVED</b>

<sup>73</sup> Source: GTZ. Small Arms Control in Cambodia - Lessons Learned from the EU-ASAC Programme. Eschborn, Germany. 2005. <http://www.gtzt.de/de/dokumente/en-decosac-EUASAC-2005.pdf>



## Annex C - Evaluation Results Matrix - SALW (Weapons) Destruction (Outputs)

OUTPUTS	OUTPUT INDICATORS	RESULT SUMMARY	RATING
Safe and effective SALW (Weapons) destruction.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Number of weapons destroyed by EU-ASAC.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>2001 - 41,742 weapons destroyed</li> <li>2002 - 23,657 weapons destroyed</li> <li>2003 - 12,355 weapons destroyed</li> <li>2004 - 24,194 weapons destroyed</li> <li>2005 - 25,828 weapons destroyed</li> <li>2006 - 11,740 weapons destroyed</li> <li>TOTAL - 142,871 weapons destroyed<sup>74</sup></li> </ul>	ACHIEVED
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Cost (€) per weapon destroyed.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>€ 2.65 (2000 - 2005)</li> </ul>	ACHIEVED
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Number of casualties during weapon destruction activities.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>NIL</li> <li>WGWR (NGO) produced a SALW Collection and Destruction Manual to enhance safety (2001).</li> </ul>	ACHIEVED

<sup>74</sup> In addition, the RCAF destroyed a further 36,505 weapons in 1999/2000, and 17,499 weapons were destroyed by the JSAC project during the period of the EU-ASAC programme.



## Annex D - Evaluation Results Matrix - Stockpile Management and Security (Outputs)

OUTPUTS	OUTPUT INDICATORS	RESULT SUMMARY	RATING
<b>Development of safe and secure SALW (Weapons) storage infrastructure and systems.</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Construction of appropriate safe and secure storage infrastructure.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>45 Weapon Storage Depots Constructed</li> <li>8 Weapon Storage Depots Renovated</li> <li>Weapons Racks provided in over 477 Police Posts</li> <li>Total storage capability developed for 158,760 weapons.</li> <li>62 x Computers and Printers, and 42 x Photocopiers, supplied to support management accounting of weapons.</li> </ul>	<b>ACHIEVED</b>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Development, installation and training on weapons registration software.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Weapons registration software developed (2001) and upgraded (2004).</li> <li>Installation and training conducted in parallel with infrastructure development.</li> </ul>	<b>ACHIEVED</b>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Development and implementation of effective operating procedures.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>'Procedures for Management, Control, and Record-keeping of Weapon Safely Stored in Depots and Daily Used Weapon of the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces' developed by EU-ASAC.</li> <li>3000 copies distributed to MOD in December 2005.</li> </ul>	<b>ACHIEVED</b>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Infrastructure development costs per weapon stored.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>€ 10.83 per weapon (2002 - 2005)</li> </ul>	<b>ACHIEVED</b>





## Annex E - Evaluation Results Matrix - SALW Awareness and CSO Development (Outputs)

OUTPUTS	OUTPUT INDICATORS	RESULT SUMMARY	RATING
Effective and targeted SALW Awareness strategies and campaigns.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>SALW 'Perception' Survey to measure impact of SALW Awareness activities.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Strongest motivation to surrender weapons was the illegality of civilian possession.</li> <li>Demonstrated awareness of the dangers of weapons.</li> <li>Demonstrated understanding that illegal weapons are on obstacle to the village's social and economic development.</li> </ul>	ACHIEVED
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Media monitoring of coverage of SALW (positive/neutral/negative)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Partial media monitoring conducted by EU-ASAC.</li> </ul>	PARTIAL
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Campaigns to support SALW Collection and Weapons Security</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>ADHOC, CIDH, CIHR and WGWR – Numerous individual campaigns and community workshops at national level.</li> <li>9 x Provincial level NGOs supported for numerous targeted campaigns at district, commune and village level.</li> <li>Peace Art Project (2003, 2004) and Exhibition (2005)</li> </ul>	ACHIEVED
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Human Rights and Good Governance training.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Kratie and Pursat - Training courses by CIHR and CIDH (2001)</li> </ul>	ACHIEVED
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Key Informant Interviews with NGO Directors and field staff.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Improved cooperation with local authorities and village members.</li> <li>Project management, budgeting and training skills acquired.</li> <li>Knowledge on weapons issues, VMG and VMPF acquired.</li> </ul>	ACHIEVED
Increase in the capacity of NGOs from involvement in SALW awareness activities and police wives training.			



## Annex F - Evaluation Results Matrix - Police Capacity Development (Outputs)<sup>75</sup>

OUTPUTS	OUTPUT INDICATORS	RESULT SUMMARY	RATING
<b>Development of a 'Code of Conduct' for security personnel.</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Development and government approval of a formal, published 'Code of Conduct'.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>National development seminar held November 2000.</li> <li>'Code of Conduct' drafted in 2001. Developed by the UNOCHR, with EU-ASAC funding the involvement of a local NGO in the development.</li> </ul>	<b>NOT ACHIEVED</b>
<b>Equipment support</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Donation of equipment to police to enhance capability to provide security post-voluntary weapons collection.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Equipment supplied to 6 provinces. (5 x Police Posts, 73 Motorcycles, 331 Mountain Bikes, 383 Radios and 10 Radio Relay Stations). (Value = € 171K).</li> </ul>	<b>ACHIEVED</b>
<b>Police family support</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Implementation of small-scale development projects to improve legal police family income options.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Provision of 10 x Village Model Gardens (VMG). (500 families benefit).</li> <li>Provision of 5 x Village Model Poultry Farms (VMPPF). (250 families benefit).</li> </ul>	<b>ACHIEVED</b>
<b>Community Based Policing (CBP) training.</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Design and delivery of CBP training packages to police officers</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>14 training courses.</li> <li>9 provinces.</li> <li>925 police officers trained in CBP.</li> <li>285 police officers trained in the draft Code of Conduct.</li> </ul>	<b>ACHIEVED</b>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Build level of community confidence in, and cooperation with the Police.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Community and individual recognition of police as the primary security providers.</li> <li>Perception of an improvement in police efficiency.</li> <li>Increased, then continued reporting to police on criminal activities.</li> </ul>	<b>ACHIEVED</b>

<sup>75</sup> This activity was bi-laterally funded, but has been included to show the depth of EU-ASAC engagement in SALW Control issues.



## Annex G - Predicted expenditure summary 2006

EXPENSES	BUDGET (€)	EXPENDITURE (€)	EXPENDITURE <sup>76</sup> (%)	REMARKS
<b>1. Human Resources</b>				
1.1 International Staff	€ 139,000	€ 139,000	33%	
1.2 National Staff	€ 162,200	€ 14,285	3%	
1.3 Insurance Costs	€ 7,600	€ 6,327	1%	
<b>Sub Total (1)</b>	<b>€ 162,800</b>	<b>€ 152,612</b>	<b>37%</b>	
<b>2. Travel Costs</b>	€ 17,300	€ 13,538	3%	
<b>3. Operational / Administration Costs</b>	€ 60,950	€ 46,220	11%	
<b>Sub Total (2 - 3)</b>	<b>€ 78,250</b>	<b>€ 59,757</b>	<b>14%</b>	
<b>4. Operational Components</b>				
4.1 Legislative and Regulatory	€ 0.00	€ 0.00		
4.2 Weapons for Development (Large)	€ 0.00	€ 0.00		
4.3 Weapons for Development (NGO)	€ 0.00	€ 0.00		
4.4 SALW Collection (Weapons Caches)	€ 0.00	€ 0.00		
4.4 Weapons Destruction	€ 32,100	€ 46,523	11%	
4.5.1 Stockpile Management and Security (RCAF)	€ 236,710	€ 165,417	38%	
4.5.1 Stockpile Management and Security (Police)	€ 0.00	€ 0.00		
4.6 SALW Awareness and CSO Development	€ 0.00	€ 0.00		
4.7 Police Capacity Development	€ 0.00	€ 0.00	0 %	
<b>Sub Total (4)</b>	<b>€ 268,810</b>	<b>€ 211,940</b>	<b>49%</b>	
<b>5. Contingencies</b>	€ 3,140	€ 0.00	0%	
<b>6. Totals</b>	<b>€ 513,000</b>	<b>€ 431,309</b>		
<b>7. Balance</b>		<b>€ 81,691</b>		

<sup>76</sup> Rounded as appropriate to one decimal place.



## Annex H - EU-ASAC Honours and Awards

DATE	HONOUR / AWARD	RECIPIENT
2001	National Construction Medal	Henny van den Graaf
2001	National Construction Medal	Alain Perigaud
21 Dec 01	Gold Medal of the Order of Sahametrei	EU ASAC (Institutional Award)
21 Dec 01	Gold Medal of the Order of Sahametrei	Henny van den Graaf
21 Dec 01	Silver Medal of the Order of Sahametrei	Alain Perigaud
21 Dec 01	Silver Medal of the Order of Sahametrei	Adrian Sprangemeijer
21 Dec 01	Silver Medal of the Order of Sahametrei	Robin Poulton
21 Dec 01	Silver Medal of the Order of Sahametrei	Dennis Brennan
21 Dec 01	Silver Medal of the Order of Sahametrei	Marc Vanhemelryck
21 Dec 01	Silver Medal of the Order of Sahametrei	Neil Wilford
21 Dec 01	Silver Medal for Services to the Cambodian People	Ms Yos Srey Vy
21 Dec 01	Silver Medal for Services to the Cambodian People	Ms Mao Chan Chakriya
21 Dec 01	Silver Medal for Services to the Cambodian People	Ms Dan Pisey
21 Dec 01	Silver Medal for Services to the Cambodian People	Mak Monyrath
21 Dec 01	Silver Medal for Services to the Cambodian People	Kry Davuth
21 Dec 01	Silver Medal for Services to the Cambodian People	Chou Bounine
21 Dec 01	Silver Medal for Services to the Cambodian People	Chao Noly
21 Dec 01	Silver Medal for Services to the Cambodian People	Seng Son
28 Oct 02	Chevalier of the Order of Sahametrei	EU ASAC (Institutional Award)
28 Oct 02	Chevalier of the Order of Sahametrei	David de Beer
28 Oct 02	Chevalier of the Order of Sahametrei	Alain Perigaud
03 Dec 02	Gold Medal of the Order of Sahametrei	David de Beer
03 Dec 02	Gold Medal for Services to the Cambodian People	Seng Son
09 Dec 05	Gold Medal for Services to the Cambodian People	Net Sothai
09 Dec 05	Officer of the Order of Sahametrei	Alain Perigaud
27 Mar 06	Commander of the Order of Sahametrei	David de Beer
27 Mar 06	Officer of the Order of Sahametrei	Adrian Sprangemeijer
20 Jun 06	Grand Commander of the Order of Sahametrei	EU ASAC (Institutional Award)
30 Jun 06	Gold Medal for Co-operation	Net Sothai
30 Jun 06	Gold Medal for Co-operation	Thann Bunthoeun
30 Jun 06	Bronze Medal for Co-operation	Dan Pisey
30 Jun 06	Bronze Medal for Co-operation	Siek Bopha
30 Jun 06	Bronze Medal for Co-operation	Ath Sona
30 Jun 06	Bronze Medal for Co-operation	Kry Davuth
30 Jun 06	Bronze Medal for Co-operation	Mak Monyrath



## Annex J - Individuals consulted

The following individuals and organizations were consulted during the preparation of this evaluation report;<sup>72</sup>

### Cambodia

JSAC	- Takeuchi Kazuki, Programme Manager
JSAC	- Kida Yasumitsu, Project Manager
Marc Vanhemelryck	- Formerly VWCP Specialist, EU-ASAC
Ministry of Defence	- Major General Son Kim Sorn, Director of Military Equipment
Ministry of Interior	- Major General Ouk Kim Lek, Director of the Department of Weapons and Explosives
NGO Phnomsrey Association for Development (PSAD)	
NGO Takmeo Community for Development of Agriculture and Industry (TCAID)	
The Community of Chikor	
The Community of Kampot	
The Community of Kroach Chmar	
The Community of Pramath Dai	
The Community of Sa Thapor	
The Community of Svay Tiep	
The Community of Talo	
The Community of Vary Keuth	
Tieng Saman	- Formerly WGWR
UNDP	- Douglas Gardner, Resident Representative
WGWR	- Prak Tepvichet, Executive Director

### European Commission

Daniela Dicorrado-Andreoni	Head of Sector, Conventional Disarmament and Human Security, DG ER/A/4
Juha Auvinen	Acting Head of Unit, CFSP and RRM; Programme Management, DG ER/A/3

### EU-ASAC Team

David de Beer	Special Advisor to the European Commission and Project Manager
Adrian Sprangemeijer	International Specialist, Weapons Destruction and Stockpile Management
Thann Bunthoeun	Finance and Administration Officer

<sup>72</sup> This does not include individuals who participated during the confirmatory SALW Perceptions Survey (SAPS) component of the evaluation, who are too numerous to mention. The evaluation team also wishes to thank them for their assistance and cooperation in the preparation of this report.





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
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